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Taxing Corporate Acquisitions: A 
Proposal For Mandatory Uniform Rules 
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INTRODUCTION 
In order to construct an acceptable system for the taxation of changes 
in the ownership of incorporated business, one must address the most 
complex conceptual problems in income taxation. To date, the complex-
ity of that undertaking has precluded the evolution of a coherent, com-
prehensive system for the taxation of corporate acquisitions. Rather, a 
variety of patterns of taxation have emerged through largely uncoordi-
nated, ad hoc legislative and judicial development. The resulting system, 
containing unsupportable distinctions and inconsistencies, is massively 
complex. 1 Moreover, one consequence of the system is that taxpayers 
possess a high degree of freedom to tailor the income tax consequences of 
their acquisitions and thereby minimize their income tax burdens. 
A major theme of the current efforts to reform this area of the law has 
been not only to retain, but also to increase the differences among these 
patterns of taxation while facilitating the ability of taxpayers to select the 
pattern desired. It is argued here that both branches of these reforms are 
misguided. Rather, the variations in the patterns of taxing acquisitions 
should be eliminated to the maximum possible extent, thereby ending the 
ability of taxpayers to select their preferred tax consequences. The tax-
I The constant complexity, frequent irrationality, and presumptive inadequacy of the taxa-
tion of corporate acquisitions belies the importance of the issue, both to the theoretical rigor of 
the taxing system and to the economy. The manner and weight of the taxation of corporate 
acquisitions is believed to influence the pace and character of corporate combinations and thus 
affect the structure of domestic business enterprise. See Tax Aspects of Mergers and Acquisi-
tions: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and the Subcomm. on Select Revenue 
Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 155-56 (1985) (state-
ment of David Brockway); Lewis, A Proposal for a Corporate Level Tax on Major Stock Sales, 
37 Tax Notes 1041, 1045 (Dec. 7, 1987). 
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ing system should contain a mandatory uniform rule for taxing the 
change in ownership of an incorporated business. 
Part I of this article reviews the historic approach to the taxation of 
corporate acquisitions, illustrating both the significance of the repeal of 
the General Utilities doctrine to the coherence of the system for taxing 
acquisitions and the range of the permissible transactional elections. 
Part II then examines the real, after-tax consequences of an elective sys-
tem for taxing acquisitions. Cost and carryover patterns of taxation are 
merely alternative mechanisms for selling the tax attributes and prefer-
ences of the corporation being acquired-generally, built-in and operat-
ing losses. However, in the current tax environment, electing the cost 
basis alternative results in an improper reduction of the corporate income 
tax. Since that option violates sound principles of tax policy, the elective 
system, whether based upon transactional or express elections, is not ap-
propriate and should be replaced with a uniform mandatory system for 
taxing corporate acquisitions. 
The potential for implementing such a mandatory pattern within our 
existing separate-entity, double-tax system for taxing corporations is de-
veloped in Part III. While difficulties in enforcing any definition of an 
acquisition must be acknowledged, a mandatory system would be feasible 
if all acquisitions were taxed as carryover basis transactions at the corpo-
rate level. The propriety of that treatment of acquisitions is defended in 
Part IV. A carryover basis pattern of taxation is the pattern most consis-
tent with the fundamental features of our system for taxing corporations 
and, in particular, with the pattern previously implemented by the Gen-
eral Utilities 2 doctrine. Since all corporate acquisitions would thus be 
treated at the corporate level as carryover basis transactions, the propo-
sal herein contemplates the complete repeal of the reorganization provi-
sions of the Code. Part V addresses the shareholder level consequences 
of a mandatory carryover basis system for taxing corporate acquisitions. 
J. EVOLUTION OF THE PROBLEl\1 
The conceptual difficulty in devising a generally acceptable pattern for 
taxing corporate acquisitions is attributable to the treatment of corpora-
tions as entities entirely separate from their owners3 and subject to an 
independent, second level of taxation.4 The taxation of corporate acqui-
2 General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935). 
3 Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920). The doctrine remains alive and well in the 
United States Supreme Court. See Commissioner v. Bollinger, 108 S. Ct. 1173 (1988). For a 
helpful summary of this and other basic tax concepts relevant for present purposes, see Faber, 
Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders: Premises of the Present System, 22 San Diego L. 
Rev. 5 (1985). 
4 IRC § 11. 
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sitions is the most severe test of the illogic of that two tier system of 
taxation. The historic inability to fashion a principled and defensible 
method for taxing such transactions is, quite simply, a natural conse-
quence of the theoretical frailty of that system. 5 
Under a rigorous application of this separate-entity, double-tax sys-
tem, transactions in corporate stock would not have any corporate level 
implications. Rather, the tax attributes of the transferred business would 
persist notwithstanding the change, regardless of how complete, in the 
ownership of the incorporated business. Fundamentally, therefore, stock 
acquisitions are carryover basis transactions at the corporate level. Con-
versely, asset transfers are fundamentally taxable transactions at the cor-
porate level. A change in the ownership of the business assets so 
transferred should eradicate the tax attributes of those assets, subject the 
transferor to a full tax on the appreciation in the assets, and produce a 
cost basis for the assets in the hands of the acquiring corporation. 
Despite this inherent inconsistency in the nominal patterns for taxing 
stock and asset transfers, wide agreement exists that the financial effect of 
stock acquisitions and asset acquisitions are far too similar to justify the 
application of such distinct patterns of taxation. 
Moreover, while sales of assets are fundamentally taxable transactions, 
the mere continuation of a business, of course, is not. An asset acquisi-
tion of an entire business activity resembles a taxable sale only when 
viewed from the perspective of the legal entities of the transferor and 
transferee corporations. From the perspective of the business itself, an 
asset acquisition accomplishes little of substance: The assets remain in-
tact, in corporate solution, and perhaps largely owned by the same share-
holders. Given certain conditions, an asset acquisition may more nearly 
resemble the mere continuation of a single corporation than a sale of 
those assets, and thus, ought not be subject to tax. 
Historically, the taxing system has accepted each of these models for 
taxing corporate acquisitions. Prior law, however, responded to the po-
tential discontinuities in the tax consequences of the varied models with 
the evolution of ad hoc doctrines. The general effects of those doctrines 
were (1) to minimize the extent of the discontinuity, and (2) to permit 
taxpayers to select from among a range of tax consequences arising from 
s Full integration of the corporate and shareholder level tax would not necessarily result in 
abandoning the distinction between cost and carryover basis acquisitions. However, the tax 
consequences of these two patterns of taxation would be greatly diminished and thus the argu-
ments in favor of two forms of taxation would be greatly weakened. Moreover, the absence of 
the corporate level tax would largely eliminate the inherent inconsistency in the treatment of 
stock and asset acquisitions. Some insight into the simplification of corporate acquisitions that 
integration could provide can be obtained by an examination of the analogous rules governing 
partnership combinations. See W. McKee, W. Nelson & R. Whitmire, Fed. Tax'n of Partner-
ships and Partners ~ 15.03[3]. 
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their transactions. The ability of taxpayers to elect among patterns of 
taxation further muted the significance of the remaining discontinuities. 
The central feature of the historic effort to bridge the discontinuity in 
the taxation of the different forms of stock and asset acquisitions was the 
General Utilities doctrine. Under that doctrine and its statutory exten-
sions, 6 the corporate level tax on asset acquisitions was excused, thus, to 
that extent, conforming the consequences to the transferor in an asset 
acquisition to the consequences of a stock acquisition. Further, the Gen-
eral Utilities doctrine muted the distinction between the patterns of tax-
ing "taxable" sales of assets and nontaxable continuations or 
"reorganizations."7 While successful in that effort, in practice, however, 
the General Utilities doctrine seemed to create distortions as serious those 
it eliminated. The doctrine ultimately was repealed in 1986.8 
The repeal of the General Utilities doctrine, however, was not accom-
panied by the adoption of an alternative system for reconciling the conse-
quences of the variety of forms of stock and asset acquisitions. Repeal, 
therefore, has materially increased the range of possible tax consequences 
of an acquisition while eroding the coherence of the statutory scheme. 
Replacing the harmonizing theme provided by the General Utilities doc-
trine has proven to be difficult. The doctrine reflected the consensus that 
prevailed during the first 73 years of our income taxation of corporations: 
Unrealized appreciation in incorporated assets ought not be subject to 
tax merely because of a change in ownership of a business. That notion 
was central to both of the primary systems for taxing an acquisition that 
have emerged. The precipitous repeal of that doctrine in all of its mani-
festations marks the dissolution of that consensus. The commentators 
today are deeply divided over the proper approach to be taken in the 
taxation of corporate acquisitions.9 In 1986, Congress instructed the 
Treasury Department to study and present proposals for revising the sys-
tem for taxing all corporate acquisitions, including the highly fragmented 
"reorganization" provisions. 10 That study, which was to be completed 
6 IRC § 337 (before repeal in 1986) [hereinafter Old§ 337]. See text accompanying note 16. 
7 Corporate acquisitions falling within the definitions contained in § 368(a). See text ac-
companying notes 27-29. 
~ Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 63l{a), 100 Stat. 2085. 
9 See e.g., ALI Federal Income Tax Project, Subchapter C 22-312 (1982) [hereinafter Sub-
chapter C Project]; Staff of Senate Finance Comm., Final Report on Subchapter C, 99th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1985) [hereinafter Senate Report on Subchapter C]; Lewis, A 
Proposal for a Corporate Level Tax on Major Stock Sales, 37 Tax Notes 1041 (Dec. 7, 1987); 
Posin, Taxing Corporate Reorganizations: Purging Penelope's Web, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1335 
(1985); Thompson, A Suggested Alternative Approach to the Senate Finance Committee 
Staff's 1985 Proposals for Revising the Merger and Acquisition Provisions, 5 Va. Tax Rev. 599 
(1986); Yin, A Carryover Basis Asset Acquisition Regime?: A Few Words of Caution, 37 Tax 
Notes 415 (Oct. 26, 1987). 
10 Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 634, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986). 
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by January 1, 1988, has yet to appear, but is still expected. 11 
A. Nonreorganization Acquisitions 
Prior to 1986, in a "taxable" acquisition, one not governed by the reor-
ganization provisions of the Code, only a single level of tax was imposed 
upon the target corporation and its shareholders in either a stock or an 
asset acquisition. The corporate level tax was imposed only in the rela-
tively uncommon circumstances in which the form of the transaction 
prevented the imposition of a shareholder level tax. 12 
In large part, this pattern of taxation derived from an initial misunder-
standing of the concept of income. From the inception of the income tax, 
it was generally understood that a unilateral transfer of appreciated prop-
erty, not in exchange for a consideration, did not result in taxable income 
to the transferor. Since the transferor did not receive anything tangible 
in exchange for the property, the transferor was not viewed as benefitting 
from the appreciation in the transferred property; therefore, he should 
not be subject to tax. As a result, neither donors of appreciated property 
to their children 13 nor corporate distributors of appreciated property to 
their shareholders were subject to tax. In the corporate context, this un-
derstanding became associated with the decision of the Supreme Court in 
General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 14 and became known as 
the General Utilities doctrine. 
While born of a confusion between the concepts of income and of reali-
zation, the General Utilities doctrine did not persist for three-quarters of 
a century because of that early lack of sophistication. Rather, the doc-
trine, and its subsequent statutory expansion, reflected a generally held, 
but not fully articulated, sense that it was inappropriate and excessive to 
bring the full burden of the double tax system to bear upon the disposi-
tion of an incorporated business regardless of the form of the dispositive 
transaction. 15 That general understanding shaped the development of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954-the only occasion in which Con-
II 42 Tax Notes 7-8 (1989). 
12 The corporate tax exemption provided by Old § 337 did not apply if the target corpora-
tion was not liquidated in order to avoid a tax at the shareholder level or if the shareholder was 
a corporate parent which would not be subject to tax upon the liquidation of a subsidiary 
under§ 332. 
13 See Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161 (1925). Similarly, an estate is not subject to tax on the 
appreciation in property used to satisfy the bequest of a fractional share of the estate. Reg. 
§ 1.661(a)-2(f)(l). 
14 In fact, both the government and the Court assumed the propriety of the tax exemption. 
The case involved exceptions to the rule that apparently had existed since the inception of the 
tax. 
15 For one expression of this view, see Nolan, Taxing Corporate Distributions of Appreci-
ated Property: Repeal of the General Utilities Doctrine and Relief Measures, 22 San Diego L. 
Rev. 97 (1985). 
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gress ever attempted an overall restatement of the rules governing cost 
basis acquisitions.I6 
Under the 1954 Code, the logic of the General Utilities doctrine was 
extended to encompass sales of assets at the corporate level providing 
only that a full compensating shareholder level tax was imposed. Thus, 
under the pre-1986 version of§ 337, the corporate level tax was not im-
posed upon sales of assets by a nonsubsidiary corporation if the target 
corporation was promptly liquidated in a transaction that subjected its 
shareholders to tax. 17 As a result, the tax imposed upon an asset acquisi-
tion was conformed to the level of taxation of stock acquisitions. 
Acquisitions accomplished through stock purchases, of course, had 
never resulted in the imposition of a corporate level tax. However, the 
separate entity concept also prevented any adjustment to the basis of the 
assets of the purchased corporation. That carryover basis pattern of tax-
ation, however, was inconsistent with the basis adjustment that was ob-
tained in an asset acquisition-although both were subject to the same 
burden of a single shareholder level tax. Accordingly, in 1954, Congress 
followed the lead of the judiciary18 and expressly permitted acquiring 
corporations to treat stock purchases as asset purchases. Thereafter, 
upon an acquisition through a stock purchase, the acquiring corporation 
could, through a transactional election that required the liquidation of 
the target corporation, 19 obtain a cost basis for the assets acquired-
16 Prior to 1954, the General Utilities doctrine excused unrealized appreciation from the 
corporate level tax when assets were removed from corporate solution through a distribution 
to shareholders. On the other hand, nothing eliminated the corporate tax if assets were sold at 
the corporate level even though the proceeds of the sale were distributed, and fully taxed, to 
shareholders. Taxpayers responded to this discontinuity by somewhat cumbersomely structur-
ing acquisitions as liquidations in kind followed by shareholder level sales of the "distributed" 
assets. After first casting doubt on the validity of this tax reduction technique in Commis-
sioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945), the Supreme Court ultimately concluded 
that this circuitous transaction effectively eliminated the corporate level tax on acquisitions. 
United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950). The resulting acquisitive 
technique was, however, absurd, and, in the 1954 recodification of the tax Jaws, Congress 
eliminated its necessity. 
17 The one exception to this pattern was for collapsible corporations as defined in § 341. 
Since Congress wished to ensure that the gain in the assets of such a corporation was subject to 
ordinary income taxation, collapsible corporations were not eligible for nonrecognition of gain 
under Old § 337. 
18 In Kimbeii-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
342 U.S. 827 (1951), the government, in a routine application of the step transaction doctrine, 
successfully argued that a stock purchase followed by a liquidation should be treated as an 
asset purchase. In later cases, however, taxpayers invoked the doctrine. See, e.g., American 
Potash & Chern. Corp. v. United States, 399 F.2d 194 (Ct. Cl. 1968). The legislative history to 
the 1982 revision of the statutory rule purports to bar the application of the judicial rule to 
achieve a stepped-up basis outside the provisions of§ 338. Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 
General Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility 
Act of 1982, 133 (Comm. Print 1982). 
19 IRC § 334(b)(2) (before amendment in 1986). 
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again, without the imposition of any corporate level tax. 
In the years following 1954 there was some uncertainty concerning the 
theoretical underpinnings of the pattern of taxation adopted by Congress. 
Some viewed the extension of the General Utilities doctrine as the mere 
acknowledgement that the corporate level tax was avoidable, and as the 
creation of a statutory procedure for making that avoidance less expen-
sive and more widely available.20 That view, however, ignored the range 
of options available to Congress in 1954 and the deliberate choice en-
acted into law.21 At that time, Congress could have, had it so chosen, 
followed the path ultimately taken in 1986.22 That Congress did not so 
. proceed was significant. The 1954 legislation was not the mere ratifica-
tion of a species of tax avoidance. Rather, it was a clear manifestation of 
the general understanding that the logic of the double tax system did not 
require the imposition of both levels of tax upon the change in ownership 
of an incorporated business, but did require the neutral treatment of 
stock and asset acquisitions. 
The 1954 legislation resulted in a consistent pattern for taxing nome-
organization corporate acquisitions that remained essentially unchanged 
for over 30 years. However, over a period of time, it became clear that 
while the 1954 solution had eliminated discontinuities among acquisitive 
techniques, it had created unacceptable discontinuities between the pat-
tern of taxing acquisitions and the pattern of taxing continuing business 
activities.23 Excusing the corporate tax on the gain inherent in corporate 
assets upon a change in ownership, while imposing the tax on that gain 
when realized by a continuing corporation, appeared to create a substan-
20 The Supreme Court itself so erred in Central Tablet Mfg. Co. v. United States, 417 U.S. 
673 (1974). There, the corporate taxpayer sought to avoid taxation on the receipt of insurance 
proceeds following the destruction of its properties by fire under Old§ 337. The Court, how-
ever, barred the tax exemption noting that this taxpayer could not have avoided the corporate 
level tax by distributing its properties to its shareholders. Since the taxpayer could not have 
benefitted from the Cumberland Public Services application of the General Utilities doctrine, 
the taxpayer fell outside of the scope of the Old § 337 version of the doctrine. 
Four years later, Congress reversed the result in Central Tablet by adding subsection (e) to 
Old § 337. That congressional action reflected the equitable conclusion that taxpayers like 
Central Tablet ought not to be subject to double taxation. 
21 See Wolfman, Corporate Distributions of Appreciated Property: The Case for Repeal of 
the General Utilities Doctrine, 22 San Diego L. Rev. 81, 82 (1985) ("Everyone in the tax world 
knew that when Congress came to review the problems of corporate taxation in 1954, the 
General Utilities doctrine would either be overruled or codified."). 
22 Discarding the General Utilities doctrine entirely and imposing a corporate level tax upon 
all distributions of appreciated property to shareholders equally would have conformed the 
consequences of corporate level asset sales to the consequences of sales following an in-kind 
liquidation-but only at the cost of creating different tax consequences for stock and asset 
acquisitions. 
23 The impropriety of that discontinuity has been pointed out most forcefully by the Ameri-
can Law Institute and its Reporter, Professor William Andrews. See Subchapter C Project, 
note 9, at 111-19. 
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tial bias in favor of corporate acquisitions. Thus, many argued, the tax-
ing system was subsidizing and encouraging corporate takeover activity 
and the formation of conglomerate enterprise. 24 In addition, the general 
acceptance of the General Utilities doctrine had been gradually eroded by 
a well publicized series of highly aggressive transactions in which taxpay-
ers sought to extend the scope of the doctrine.25 In 1986, continuing 
unease over the past abuses of the rule combined with the need for reve-
nue from the corporate sector, and, with the encouragement of those 
24 See H.R. Rep. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 281-82 (1985). At first it appeared that this bias 
would be effectively eliminated through the disappearance of the corporate level tax. During 
the 1970's a considerable sentiment began to emerge in favor of relieving, if not eliminating, 
the corporate tax through one or another form of integration. See e.g, Treasury Department, 
Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform (1977). Integration, however, was opposed both by corporate 
managers, who feared increased pressure for the distribution of dividends, and by the high tax 
bracket owners of closely held corporations, who used the lower rates of the corporate tax in 
combination with the preferential rate of tax on capital gains as an effective tax shelter. See 
Lee, Entity Classification and Integration: Publicly Traded Partnerships, Personal Service Cor-
porations and the Tax Legislative Process, 8 Va. Tax Rev. 57, 70 (1988); Leonard, Pragmatic 
View of Corporate Integration, 35 Tax Notes 889, 895 (June 1, 1987); Warren, the Relation 
and Integration of Individual and Corporate Income Taxes, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 719 (1981). 
While the integration movement thus rapidly evaporated, supply side economics quickly took 
its place. In 1981, Congress adopted a highly accelerated depreciation system. IRC § 168. As 
a result, corporate tax collections plummeted and many viewed the tax as effectively repealed. 
See Eustice, Alternatives for Limiting Loss Carryovers, 22 San Diego L. Rev. 149, 151 (1985); 
Graetz, Introduction to the Edwin S. Cohen Tax Symposium: An Overview of Business Taxa-
tion, 5 Va. Tax Rev. 577 (1986); Warren, Corporate Integration Proposals and ACRS, 22 San 
Diego L. Rev. 325, 329 (1985). 
Five years later, in one of the violent shifts in policy that has seized tax legislation in recent 
years, the significance of the corporate tax was resurrected. An unlikely marriage among con-
servative supply side economists, the ancient advocates of a more comprehensive definition of 
the tax base, and modem antagonists of the tax shelter industry produced a substantial revi-
sion, if not reform, of the individual income tax. See J. Birmbaum & J. Murray, Showdown at 
Gucci Gulch: Lawmakers, Lobbyists and the Unlikely Triumph of Tax Reform (1987); Bitt-
ker, Tax Reform-Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 44 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 11 (1987). The 
revenue loss resulting from the lower, and flatter, rate structure enacted in 1986, however, was 
unacceptable in light of the current federal budgetary deficits. See Handler, Budget Reconcili-
ation and the Tax Law: Legislative History or Legislative Hysteria?, 37 Tax Notes 1259, 1263-
64 (Dec. 21, 1987). That revenue need, coupled with popular antagonism towards the excesses 
of the 1981 corporate tax reduction, inevitably resulted in a major strengthening of the corpo-
rate income tax. See Minarik, How Tax Reform Came About, 37 Tax Notes 1359, 1364 (Dec. 
28, 1987). As one result, the taxation of corporate acquisitions again became a matter of 
concern. 
zs The exemption from the corporate level tax for sales of assets was available only if the 
target corporation completely liquidated, thus subjecting its shareholders to tax upon the en-
tire amount of their gain. Taxpayers seeking to avoid this limitation began to exploit the 
exemption from the corporate tax that attached to nonliquidating distributions. In 1969, sys-
tematic redemptions of public shareholders with appreciated property precipitated an amend-
ment to § 3ll(d) to tax the appreciation to the distributing corporation. By 1986, public 
corporations had progressed to selling subsidiaries by causing the prospective purchaser to first 
acquire stock of the target's parent which would be redeemed in exchange for the stock of the 
subsidiary to be acquired. See Esmark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 171 (1988). 
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seeking to end acquisitions inspired by the discontinuity in the corporate 
tax, produced the complete repeal of the General Utilities doctrine. 
The precipitous imposition of a full corporate level tax on acquisitive 
transactions eliminated one discontinuity in the taxation of corporations. 
However, enacted in isolation, the repeal left the broad pattern for taxing 
those transactions in disarray.26 Most prominently, the 1986 legislation 
destroyed the tax neutrality between stock and asset acquisitions, which 
had been the hallmark of the 1954 solution. In addition, the legislative 
modifications in the manner of taxing acquisitions created a substantial 
disparity between the patterns of taxing cost and carryover basis acquisi-
tions, thus greatly increasing the range of the optional tax consequences 
from which taxpayers could choose. 
B. Reorganizations 
While the rules so governing "taxable" acquisitions developed as rela-
tively minor adaptations of the general principles of income taxation, 
from almost the inception of the income tax, Congress has authorized a 
special scheme for taxing a subcategory of corporate acquisitions. If the 
consideration paid by the acquiring corporation consisted of a specified 
proportion of acquiring corporation stock, 27 either a stock or an asset 
acquisition might be treated as a carryover basis transaction at the corpo-
rate leveJ.28 Moreover, for those shareholders of the target corporation 
who received stock in the acquisition, the exchange might also be treated 
as a carryover basis transaction at the shareholder leveJ.29 Thus, in a 
reorganization, the corporate level tax was not excused because of the 
application of a shareholder level tax. Rather, the tax was excused be-
26 Just four years before, the taxation of stock acquisitions had been extensively revised on 
the assumption that acquiring corporations in general would seek a cost basis for the acquired 
assets, a result that was facilitated through the adoption of a relatively straightforward express 
election to replace the requirement that the target corporation be liquidated. IRC § 338. How-
ever, with the subsequent repeal of the General Utilities doctrine, the price for achieving that 
basis adjustment became a full corporate level tax-a price that few were prepared to bear. As 
a result, in actual practice, the objective in a stock acquisition became avoiding the uninten-
tional election of the simplified procedure enacted four years previously and preserving carry-
over basis treatment. 
The purchaser of stock was left with the ability to elect between cost and carryover basis 
transactions, but the tax cost of electing cost basis treatment had become so high that the 
election could only be made in special circumstances. On the other hand, the repeal of the 
General Utilities doctrine treated all nonreorganization asset acquisitions as fully taxable, cost 
basis acquisitions. 
27 Under the judicially developed continuity of proprietary interest doctrine, a reorganiza-
tion within the meaning of § 368 could not occur unless shareholders of the target obtained a 
meaningful equity interest in the acquiring corporation. See LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415 
(1940). For most forms of acquisitive reorganizations, this judicial doctrine has been codified 
and strengthened in § 368. 
28 IRC § 381. 
29 IRC §§ 354, 358. 
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cause the transaction might properly be viewed as more nearly resem-
bling the continuation of the target corporation than a taxable 
disposition by that corporation. 
In general effect, these so-called reorganization provisions permitted 
the parties to an acquisition to elect to defer all or a part of the share-
holder level tax otherwise payable, but only at the cost of converting the 
exemption from the corporate level tax obtained in a cost basis acquisi-
tion into a mere deferral of that tax through the mechanism of a carry-
over basis. While qualifying an acquisition as a reorganization might 
materially benefit the stockholders of the target corporation, prior to 
1986, the significance of obtaining that treatment at the corporate level 
was limited. 
In a stock acquisition, carryover basis treatment could be received re-
gardless of whether the acquisition constituted a reorganization; there-
fore, reorganization classification was of little concern. In an asset 
acquisition of a profitable target corporation, reorganization treatment 
avoided taxation of the target. However, under the General Utilities doc-
trine, the target would not in any event have been taxed on the apprecia-
tion in the value of its assets. Prior to the repeal of that doctrine, a 
developing mix of case law and statutory rules required that the operat-
ing income of the target corporation for its final year be adjusted under 
tax benefit principles. For example, if the target had claimed tax deduc-
tions for depreciation30 or the purchase of supplies31 that had not been 
supported by the time of the acquisition by economic consumption, the 
target was required to include in income the excess of the deduction over 
the economic loss. Reorganization treatment deferred the making of that 
tax benefit adjustment to income, but only at the cost of forgoing an 
increase in the basis of the target assets. On the other hand, qualifying 
an asset acquisition of a target having operating losses as a reorganiza-
tion could be of greater importance. The loss carryover would survive 
the acquisition only in a carryover basis acquisition and that could only 
be achieved pursuant to the reorganization provisions. 
In general, therefore, during the era dominated by the General Utilities 
doctrine, the tax differences between taxable and reorganization treat-
ment at the corporate level were not as great as might be supposed. The 
repeal of that doctrine, however, has greatly magnified those differences. 
Significantly, under prior law, as today, the ability to elect between cost 
and carryover basis treatment is primarily of significance to target corpo-
rations having operating losses for sale. 
JO The depreciation recapture rules of§ 1245 overrode the nonrecognition provisions of Old 
§ 337. Reg. § 1.1245-6(b). 
JJ Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 398, 401 (1983). 
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In contrast to the comprehensive revision of the rules governing taxa-
ble acquisitions which occurred in 1954, the rules governing reorganiza-
tions have never been revised. To the contrary, those rules have been 
continually subject to ad hoc amendments-often, to extend reorganiza-
tion treatment to specific new forms of acquisitive transactions. 32 As a 
result, the reorganization provisions have come to consist of a bewilder-
ing array of inconsistent and sometimes irrational statutory provisions 
supplemented by case law doctrine and administrative practice.33 A cat-
alogue of the enormous inadequacies in the reorganization provisions is 
unnecessary for the purposes of this article. 34 However, if the proposal 
here to repeal those provisions were not adopted, a pressing need to re-
form those provisions would remain. 
C. Transactional Election 
Under present law, the income tax consequences of an acquisition are 
almost completely within the control of the parties. 35 The traditional 
pattern of taxing corporate acquisitions has involved the drawing of a 
complex series of definitional lines across the continuum of acquisitive 
transactions at relatively arbitrary points. Because of the highly arbi-
trary manner by which cost and carryover basis acquisitions are thereby 
distinguished, the parties to an acquisition are free to adjust the tax con-
sequences of the transaction to achieve the result they desire by making 
only highly insubstantial changes in the underlying form of the 
acquisition. 36 
32 See LeDuc, Current Proposals to Restructure the Taxation of Corporate Acquisitions 
and Dispositions: Substance and Process, 22 San Diego L. Rev. 17, 26-7 (1985). 
33 See Senate Report on Subchapter C, note 9, at 37-38. 
34 For one treatment, see Posin, Taxing Corporate Reorganizations: Purging Penelope's 
Web, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1335 (1985). Also see Subchapter C Project, note 9, at 22-28; Senate 
Report on Subchapter C, note 9, at 37-38. 
Js See Faber, Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders: Premises of the Present System, 
22 San. Diego L. Rev. 5, 7-8 (1985). 
36 The reorganization provisions of the Code, for example, are not elective in form; in fact it 
may be the Commissioner who asserts their application. See, e.g., McDonald's Restaurants, 
Inc. v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1982). Nevertheless, in practice, obtaining the 
reorganization pattern of carryover basis taxation is entirely elective by transactional form. 
The definitions of both the stock and asset acquisitions that constitute reorganizations are rigid 
and highly arbitrary. With insignificant exceptions, both stock and nonmerger asset acquisi-
tions, for example, require that the sole consideration for the acquisition payable to the target 
corporation or its shareholders must be voting stock of a single acquiring corporation. As a 
result, taxpayers can obtain reorganization treatment by adhering to the statutory require-
ments or can avoid that treatment by making economically trivial changes in the form of the 
acquisition. 
The elective feature of existing law is enhanced by the fact that an asset acquisition may 
occur either by a statutory merger under state law or by a nonmerger asset transfer. While the 
end result of both forms of acquisitions is identical, the tax law requirements for reorganiza-
tion type carryover basis treatment of these two formats vary widely. 
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The range of the resulting elections under current law readily appears 
from a simplified synthesis of the primary rules governing the taxation of 
corporate acquisitions. At the corporate level, carryover basis can be ob-
tained through either any manner of stock acquisition or an asset acquisi-
tion that constitutes a reorganization. In such a carryover basis 
acquisition, the consequences at the shareholder level may be either taxa-
ble or nontaxable. If the acquisition is of stock, the shareholder level 
transaction can be made taxable by using a trivial amount of nonstock 
consideration,37 or can be made nontaxable if the consideration is solely 
voting stock. In a carryover basis asset acquisition, the transaction must, 
in form, be nontaxable at the shareholder level, 38 but only for perhaps a 
majority of the target shareholders. 39 However, there is little to bar even 
those shareholders from disposing of the stock received and thus creating 
a taxable transaction. 40 The remaining shareholders may receive either 
taxable or nontaxable consideration. 
A cost basis also can be obtained at the corporate level following either 
a stock41 or an asset acquisition by avoiding reorganization treatment. In 
such an acquisition, the shareholder level transaction, in form, must be 
taxable.42 However, following an asset acquisition, the results of carry-
over basis at the shareholder level can be approximated either by not 
liquidating the target corporation43 or, in some cases, by deferring the 
shareholder tax on a liquidation of the target through the use of the in-
stallment method of reporting gain.44 If the acquisition were of stock, 
37 See Chapman v. Commissioner, 618 F.2d 856 (1st Cir. 1980). 
38 Today, a carryover basis asset acquisition is only possible in a reorganization described in 
§ 368(a)(l )(A) or (C). For a reorganization to occur, a substantial portion of the consideration 
must be nonrecognition property. 
39 In a merger-type asset acquisition, only the judicial continuity of interest rules apply. 
Thus, a substantial portion of the consideration received by the target shareholders must be 
nonrecognition property; the balance, however, may be taxable. See note 27 and accompany-
ing text. 
40 Compare Penrod v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1415 (1987), with McDonald's Restaurants, 
Inc. v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1982). 
41 A cost basis election can be made under § 338. 
42 An election under § 338 cannot be made unless the acquiring corporation purchases 80% 
of the stock of the target in a taxable transaction. IRC § 338(h)(3). 
43 Prior to the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine, target corporations were normally 
liquidated following an asset sale in order to obtain the benefits of Old § 337. The repeal of 
that section has largely eliminated the benefit of such liquidations and thus has facilitated the 
deferral of tax at the shareholder level. 
44 Under § 453(h), if the target assets are sold for notes of the acquiring corporation the 
gain on which is reportable on the installment method, the target shareholders may be entitled 
to defer the taxation of their gain on the liquidation of the target until payments are made on 
the notes. However, there are several limitations on the use of the installment method that 
may bar this relief. For example, if the acquiring corporation notes are "readily tradable," 
installment reporting is not available. IRC § 453(f)(4). The result is less clear if the stock of 
the target corporation was readily tradable. Under § 453(k)(2), gain on the sale of traded 
securities is not eligible for installment reporting. The liquidation of the target is an exchange, 
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similar but somewhat more limited possibilities for deferral of tax 
through installment reporting also exist.45 Moreover, up to 20% of the 
target shareholders may escape taxable treatment either by not tendering 
their target stock or by engaging in a complex transaction46 sheltered 
from tax by § 351.47 
D. Summary 
The separate-entity, double-tax system yields competing models for 
the taxation of corporate acquisitions; the notion that an acquisition es-
sentially may be a mere continuation of the enterprise yields others. His-
torically, the taxing system has adopted all of those models, thus creating 
a massive, complex, and uncoordinated system for taxing corporate ac-
quisitions. Nevertheless, at least at the corporate level, the historical dif-
ferences among the tax consequences of acquisitions were far less than 
might have appeared. Today, by contrast, with the repeal of the General 
Utilities doctrine, the differences in the tax consequences between cost 
and carryover basis acquisitions is substantial; far greater than at any 
previous time. Secondly, the parties to an acquisition have almost com-
plete freedom to select the desired pattern of taxing their transaction 
from among these alternatives. Under present law, therefore, the parties 
to an acquisition have the ability to choose from a wide range of tax 
consequences for their transaction at both the corporate and shareholder 
levels. Aside from the inability to select and enforce a single pattern for 
taxing acquisitions, why any election of tax consequence should be ex-
tended is far from evident. 
One obvious consequence of this multifaceted statutory pattern of tax-
ation is the enormous complexity of the tax rules governing acquisitions. 
A less apparent consequence is that the ability to design the tax conse-
quences of an acquisition, and thus minimize the income tax burden of a 
transaction, inevitably results in a loss of tax revenue in comparison to 
any uniform system for taxing acquisitions. A principal source of the 
not a sale, and thus should not be governed by this rule, although that result is presently 
unclear. 
45 Unless the target has a very small number of shareholders, notes issued by the acquiring 
corporation to those shareholders quite likely will be readily tradable and thus ineligible for 
installment reporting. 
46 Shareholders wishing to defer tax may contribute their target stock to a newly formed 
subsidiary of the acquiring corporation in a nontaxable exchange for any type of stock of that 
subsidiary in a § 351 exchange. Rev. Rul. 84-71, 1984-1 C.B. 106. 
47 In practice, other possible combinations of results are possible. For example, the acquir-
ing corporation may treat the acquisition as a taxable purchase, resulting in a cost basis, while 
the shareholders may inconsistently report the transaction as a reorganization. See, e.g., King 
Enters., Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511 (Ct. Cl. 1969). 
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resulting under-taxation is demonstrated in the following portion of this 
article. 
II. CORPORATE LEVEL ELECTION 
The difficulty in deriving a single, theoretically rigorous approach to 
the taxation of corporate acquisitions has caused many students of this 
intractable corner of the tax law to endorse granting to the parties to an 
acquisition an express election between cost basis and carryover basis 
consequences at the corporate level. Such a position was explicitly 
adopted by the American Law Institute in 1982 and has obtained some 
acceptance by the staff of the Senate Finance Committee. In general, the 
ALI proposed replacing the complex and uncertain transactional elec-
tions of present law with an express election between taxable, cost basis 
and tax-free, carryover basis patterns of taxation at the corporate level 
that would apply to all corporate acquisitions.48 Those proposals, which 
would substantially improve present law, have become the starting point, 
or foil, for subsequent efforts at reform. Nevertheless, expressly elective 
treatment is justifiable only if the transactional elections to be rational-
ized are themselves justifiable. 
Elective treatment would appear defensible if it were concluded that 
both of the patterns that might be elected (that is, cost and carryover 
basis) were appropriate patterns of taxation or, at least, that the presence 
of both patterns was unavoidable and might as well be rationalized.49 
Even if both patterns of taxation, in isolation, might appropriately be 
invoked in the taxation of corporate acquisitions, however, it does not 
necessarily follow that an election between those patterns is appropriate. 
This part examines the consequence of permitting such an election under 
the current pattern of taxing corporations generally. 
A. Benchmark Consequences of an Acquisition 
In an elective system for taxing acquisitions, the pattern of taxation 
selected by the parties under normal conditions will be carryover basis. 
That pattern will be chosen because, if both parties to the transaction 
face the same effective rates of taxation, a carryover basis acquisition will 
be more favorable by the value of the deferral of the tax liability that 
would be imposed upon a cost basis acquisition. Viewing the matter 
from the other perspective, the benefit that the acquiring corporation ob-
tains from the making of a cost basis election is an increase in the tax 
basis of the transferred properties. That increase, of course, translates 
48 Subchapter C Project, note 9, at 43. 
49 The American Law Institute appears to so view the matter. See Subchapter C Project, 
note 9, at 36-41. 
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into an increase in the offsets and deductions against its taxable income 
from loss, depreciation, or other cost recovery allowances. On the other 
hand, the detriment that the target corporation suffers from the cost basis 
election is the immediate imposition of a tax on precisely the same 
amount. 50 Since the present value of that tax burden will inevitably be 
greater than the present value of the deferred tax benefit from the greater 
cost recovery allowances, under normal conditions the cost basis election 
will produce an increase in the overall tax liabilities of the parties to the 
acquisition relative to the burden of a carryover basis election. 
The election of carryover basis treatment, however, does not mean that 
the target corporation completely avoids the burden of the corporate tax 
on the appreciation in its properties. To the contrary, the deferred in-
come tax attributable to the appreciation inherent in the assets of the 
target corporation constitutes a liability of the target corporation that 
must ultimately be borne by that corporation regardless of the immediate 
tax consequences of the transaction. In a cost basis acquisition, an ex-
plicit, recognizable tax is imposed upon the target corporation that di-
rectly reduces the net proceeds of the transaction. In contrast, in a 
carryover basis acquisition, the deferred obligation to pay that tax is as-
sumed by the acquiring corporation. The lower tax basis for the trans-
ferred properties will result in an increase in taxable income.51 
Ultimately, the acquiring corporation will bear an increased tax liability 
that will approximately equal the tax that would have been imposed 
upon the target corporation in a cost basis acquisition. Because the ac-
quiring corporation in a carryover basis acquisition thus will assume a 
tax liability that it would not assume in a cost basis acquisition, the 
purchase price in a carryover basis acquisition rationally must be made 
less than the price that would be paid in a cost basis acquisition by the 
present value of the deferred tax liability assumed. 52 The difference be-
so Both the gain taxable to the target and the basis increase received by the acquiring corpo-
ration must equal the excess of the value of the target properties over their aggregate adjusted 
bases. 
51 The "tax" imposed on the acquiring corporation in a carryover basis acquisition attribu-
table to the receipt of target assets having a carryover basis will not commonly be an actual tax 
imposed on gain generated by a disposition of those assets. Rather, the reduced basis of the 
assets will result in a reduction of the depreciation or other cost recovery allowances available 
to the acquiring corporation, and thus, will cause an increase in the income or gain realized by 
the corporation. 
Unlike the immediate tax imposed as the result of electing a cost basis acquisition, however, 
this increase in taxable income will not be entirely realized in the year of the acquisition. 
Rather, that increase will be realized over the period of time during which the acquired assets 
are depreciated. As a result, the present value of the interest-free deferred tax liability to the 
acquiring corporation will be considerably less than the element of appreciation multiplied by 
the acquiring corporation's marginal tax rate. 
52 To illustrate, assume that the assets of the target corporation have a fair market value of 
$100 in the sense that the assets could be sold for that amount in a fully taxable transaction 
and that the aggregate tax bases for these assets is $40. Both the target and the acquiring 
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tween the purchase prices that will be paid in cost and carryover basis 
acquisitions constitutes an implicit tax imposed upon the target 
corporation. 53 
The relationship between the implicit tax imposed in a carryover basis 
acquisition and the explicit tax imposed in a cost basis acquisition de-
pends upon the relative negotiating strengths of the parties to the acquisi-
tion. The difference between the present value of the deferred tax 
corporation face a marginal rate of tax of 33% and that tax cannot be deferred indefinitely. 
The following chart summarizes the tax consequences at the corporate level of a fully taxable, 
cost basis acquisition. 
Cost basis 
Purchase price $100 
Basis 40 
Gain 60 
Tax on Target 20 
Proceeds to shareholders 80 
Basis to Acquiring 100 
Deferred gain 0 
If the acquisition had been conducted as a carryover basis acquisition, the 
consequences of the transaction would be changed as follows. 
Carryover basis 
Purchase price 
Basis 
Gain 
Tax on Target 
Proceeds to shareholders 
FMV assets to 
Acquiring 
Basis to Acquiring 
Deferred gain 
Tax 
Total cost of assets 
80 
40 
0 
0 
80 
100 
40 
60 
20 
100 
In a carryover basis acquisition, the assets of the target contain, in the hands of the acquir-
ing corporation, the same element of appreciation that the assets had in the hands of the target. 
As a result, the acquiring corporation necessarily assumes the liability of the target to pay the 
same amount of income tax that would have been imposed upon the target in a taxable, cost 
basis acquisition. See Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, Federal Income Tax Aspects of 
Mergers and Acquisitions 10 (Comm. Print 1985). 
53 If the acquiring corporation is subject to a low rate of tax, or is exempt from taxation, the 
relationship described in the text will be disturbed. First, because the acquiring corporation 
will not be subject to an explicit tax, it may not impose an adequate implicit tax on the target. 
The possibility that tax-exempt purchasers may outbid taxable purchasers for the target assets, 
however, is a universal problem. See e.g., Brown v. Commissioner, 380 U.S. 563 (1965). 
Of greater present concern, a tax-exempt acquiring corporation may be able to convert the 
deferral of tax in a carryover basis acquisition into a permanent exemption from tax. That 
result might occur, of course, in either an elective or mandatory carryover basis scheme and 
thus should be addressed without regard to the proposal here. In an important recent amend-
ment to the Code, Congress has barred the use of operating losses of acquiring corporations to 
offset the tax on the built-in appreciation in the target assets which greatly diminishes the 
scope of this potential erosion of the corporate tax base. IRC § 384. See also IRC §§ 367 
(foreign purchasers), 512 through 514 (exempt organizations). 
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liability assumed in a carryover basis acquisition and the explicit tax im-
posed in a cost basis acquisition represents the tax savings resulting from 
the carryover basis election. If the entire benefit of those tax savings is 
retained by the acquiring corporation, the implicit and explicit taxes im-
posed upon the target will be identical. To the extent that the tax savings 
are passed to the target corporation through an increase in the purchase 
price, the implicit tax will be less than the explicit tax. 
B. Conditions Favorable to a Cost Basis Election 
The parties to an acquisition will prefer a cost basis acquisition only if 
electing that pattern of taxation results in one party's being made better 
off and the other party not being made worse off. That condition will 
only occur when volunteering the explicit tax will result in a burden of 
taxation on the acquisition that is less than the tax burden that would be 
imposed in a nonrecognition, carryover basis acquisition. That reduction 
in overall tax burden can be obtained only if the effective rate of tax on 
the target corporation is lower than the effective rate of tax facing the 
acquiring corporation. If, because of that lower rate, the explicit tax im-
posed upon the target corporation is less than the present value of the tax 
benefits obtained by the higher rate acquiring corporation from the in-
crease in tax basis produced by the cost basis election, the election may 
provide an overall benefit to the parties. By yielding a portion of the tax 
benefit from the resulting increase in basis, the acquiring corporation 
may be able to fully compensate the target corporation for the explicit 
tax imposed by virtue of the cost basis election. 54 In that event, both 
corporations can be made better off under the cost basis election than 
they would have been in a carryover basis acquisition. 
Historically, a number of different features in the pattern of taxing 
corporations might have produced a low marginal rate of tax on target 
54 In the example used above in note 52, the tax benefit to the acquiring corporation from 
the $60 increase in basis may be assumed to have a present value of $15. If the rate of tax 
imposed upon the target were also 33% resulting in a tax of $20, the acquiring corporation 
could not rationally reimburse the target for the full amount of that tax. However, if the 
effective rate of tax upon the target was 25%, the tax cost of a cost basis acquisition would 
decline to below $15. If the acquiring corporation increases the purchase price from the 
amount that would be paid in a carryover basis acquisition by the present value of the tax 
benefits obtained from the election, i.e., $15, the acquiring corporation will not be made worse 
off than it would be under carryover basis, while the target will have obtained a full reimburse-
ment for the explicit tax. Subtracting an explicit tax of$15 from a purchase price of$95 would 
leave the target with net proceeds available for distribution to its shareholders of $80. Because 
that amount equals the amount the target shareholders would be able to receive in a carryover 
basis acquisition, the parties will be indifferent between electing a carryover basis or a cost 
basis acquisition. 
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corporations in cost basis acquisitions. 55 In the current tax environment, 
however, the most common explanation for a low rate of tax upon a 
target corporation will be the existence of net operating losses in the tar-
get56 or the consolidated group of which it is a member. 57 If the gain 
produced by a cost basis acquisition can be absorbed in whole or in part 
by loss carryforwards available to the target, its overall tax burden may 
be reduced to an amount less than the tax benefit obtained by the acquir-
ing corporation from the resulting basis adjustment. Cost basis acquisi-
tions are economically rational, therefore, only when the resulting tax is 
absorbed by operating losses. 
The availability of operating losses, however, does not necessarily 
mean that the parties to the acquisition will benefit from a cost basis 
election. In the simple case of the acquisition of a nonsubsidiary corpo-
ration, the operating loss will survive a carryover basis acquisition and 
remain available to offset the taxable income of the acquiring corporation 
in the years following the acquisition. The loss itself thus constitutes a 
transferable asset of the target that is of value to the acquiring corpora-
tion. Therefore, in a carryover basis acquisition, the target will demand, 
55 Prior to 1986, the principal explanation for that result would have been the General Utili-
ties doctrine which had been statutorily extended to relieve virtually all target corporations 
from tax on a great portion of the unrealized appreciation in their assets. Under the 73-year 
regime of the General Utilities doctrine, the amount of tax imposed upon target corporations 
quite commonly was less than the present value of the tax benefits obtained by the acquiring 
corporation. The resulting discontinuity in the application of the corporate income tax created 
a major incentive to asset transfers and a substantial preference in favor of cost basis acquisi-
tions. That rule, however, has now been repealed. At present, target corporations are nomi-
nally subject to full taxation with respect to transferred assets, and the General Utilities 
incentive for cost basis acquisitions no longer exists. 
Also, throughout most of the history of the income tax, gain attributable to the disposition 
of capital assets was subject to a preferential, sometimes highly preferential, rate of tax. In 
1986, capital gains derived by corporations were subject to a maximum rate of tax of 28%, 
IRC § 1201(a)(2), while the tax on ordinary income reached 46%. IRC § 11(b). Even in the 
absence of the General Utilities doctrine, the effective rate of tax imposed upon a target corpo-
ration might be substantially lowered if a major portion of the gain in its assets were eligible for 
this preferential rate. That preference, however, was also repealed in 1986 and thus, at pres-
ent, does not provide any incentive for cost basis acquisitions. 
The capital gains preference, however, cannot be entirely ignored. While absent from cur-
rent law, its reinstatement, at least with respect to corporate stock, remains expected by most 
commentators. The broader reintroduction of that preference, in a form that would apply to a 
significant portion of the assets of typical target corporations, would, of course, require a re-
evaluation of the analysis that follows in the text. However, the same conclusion would likely 
be reached. See note 71 and accompanying text. 
56 Under§ 172(a) through (d), the net losses from the conduct of a business can be carried 
over and deducted against the income of the taxpayer in the three prior and 15 subsequent 
years. The purpose of the operating loss deduction is to mitigate the harshness of annual 
accounting on taxpayers having uneven flows of income and expense. Absent these provisions, 
such a taxpayer could be taxed on its income in profitable years, but, could obtain no benefits 
from losses in unprofitable years. 
57 Under§ 1.1502-21 of the regulations, the consolidated operating losses of members of the 
group are generally available to offset the consolidated income of the group. 
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and the acquiring corporation be willing to extend, additional compensa-
tion for that loss. That asset, however, possesses a unique quality. While 
it may be purchased and used by the acquiring corporation in a carryover 
basis acquisition, the asset will be destroyed if a cost basis election is 
made. The presence of this unique asset thus complicates the parties' 
choices. 
If the parties elect a carryover basis acquisition, the operating loss sur-
vives the transaction and generates a stream of tax deductions to the ac-
quiring corporation. Accordingly, the transferable loss will result in an 
increase in the purchase price received by the target corporation by an 
amount determined by the value of that loss to the acquiring corporation. 
That value is a function of the amount of the loss and the rate at which 
the loss can be applied to offset the otherwise taxable income of the ac-
quiring corporation. The faster the loss can be used, the greater its pres-
ent value. 
On the other hand, if the parties elect cost basis treatment, the acquir-
ing corporation will obtain an increase in the tax basis for the target as-
sets, but does not receive its operating losses. Like the operating loss, 
however, that increase in tax basis will produce a stream of deductions 
that are of similar value to the acquiring corporation. Accordingly, in a 
cost basis acquisition, the purchase price received by the target will be 
increased by an amount determined by that value.58 However, in con-
trast to a carryover basis acquisition, the entire amount of the increase in 
purchase price paid in a cost basis acquisition may not generate net pro-
ceeds to the target corporation because cost basis acquisitions are subject 
to tax at the corporate level. While that tax may be offset by the target's 
operating losses, any remaining tax payable will diminish the net pro-
ceeds of the transaction. 
Since the parties will prefer the form of acquisition that will generate 
the greatest net after-tax proceeds, a cost basis acquisition will be elected 
only if the value of the basis increase to the acquiring corporation re-
duced by the explicit tax imposed upon the target corporation exceeds 
the value of the operating losses to the acquiring corporation. 
ss That purchase of tax deductions through the purchase of basis will in all likelihood be at 
quite a bargain price. Returning to the illustration in note 52, at a cost of $85, the acquiring 
corporation obtained assets with a tax basis of only $40. If the target has available to it losses 
that will completely absorb any gain on the transfer, the target will benefit from converting the 
transaction into a cost basis acquisition at a purchase price of $86. For the payment of that 
additional $1, the acquiring corporation obtains an increase in the basis of the assets of $46-
from $40 to $86! 
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C. Essential Identity of Cost and Carryover Basis Treatment 
Viewed in isolation, cost and carryover basis acquisitions appear as 
distinct and equally acceptable patterns of taxation. Examination of the 
considerations that would lead to the making of a cost basis election, 
however, suggests that in an elective regime they are neither. Regardless 
of the form of acquisition, the acquiring corporation obtains the physical 
assets of the business and the target obtains the purchase price in cash or 
another form of consideration. If the target in addition has a transferable 
operating loss, that asset, too, will be sold to the acquiring corporation 
for a payment in excess of the purchase price attributable to the physical 
assets. The sale either may be direct (as in the case of a carryover basis 
acquisition), or may be indirect. In a cost basis acquisition, the target 
corporation's operating losses are converted into an increase in tax basis 
which is then sold to the acquiring corporation in much the same manner 
as the operating losses would have been sold in a carryover basis acquisi-
tion. That tax basis, of course, generates tax deductions which will be 
available to offset the income of the acquiring corporation exactly as 
would an operating loss. Thus, in each instance, the acquiring corpora-
tion purchases the offsets against income that had been available to the 
target and the target is compensated for the transfer of those tax benefits 
by an increase in the purchase price received. 
Moreover, in either form of transaction, the target corporation will, to 
some extent, bear the economic burden of the income tax attributable to 
the appreciation in its assets. As described above, in a carryover basis 
acquisition, the target will be forced to bear an implicit tax-imposed 
through a reduction in the purchase price-that represents the present 
value of that deferred tax liability to the acquiring corporation. And, in 
either form of acquisition, the target corporation will use its operating 
losses to reduce the tax imposed upon the transaction. In a taxable ac-
quisition, the target can directly offset its taxable gain with its operating 
losses. In a carryover basis transaction, the implicit tax imposed upon 
the target is offset in a corresponding manner through the sale of the 
operating loss. To the extent that the loss will be available to the acquir-
ing corporation, the purchase price will be increased. That increased 
price effectively reduces the implicit tax imposed upon the target. In sub-
stance, either form of acquisition is essentially taxable and either form of 
tax can be offset by the operating losses of the target. 
Rather than constituting distinct patterns of taxation, cost and carry-
over basis acquisitions are merely alternative techniques for accomplish-
ing essentially identical objectives. Making a cost basis election is simply 
one mechanism for selling the operating losses of the target to the acquir-
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ing corporation. s9 
Without question, the complexity of the rules governing corporate ac-
quisitions is greatly increased by the existence of alternative patterns of 
taxation. Even if both resulting tax burdens· were acceptable as a matter 
of sound income tax policy, it should seriously be questioned whether 
that added complexity is justifiable when its primary function is only to 
provide alternative mechanisms for transferring operating losses. 
Whatever value might be assigned to the planning flexibility the dual 
mechanisms create would seem vastly outweighed by the costs of the pro-
visions. Indeed, the only evident justification for such a statutory scheme 
would be the historic inability to select and impose a uniform system for 
taxing corporate acquisitions. 
D. Cost Basis Election as a Tax Subsidy 
The tax burdens produced by cost and carryover basis treatments, 
however, are not equally acceptable. To the contrary, in an elective sys-
tem for taxing acquisitions, the cost basis election results in an improper 
reduction of the corporate income tax. A cost basis election becomes 
advantageous only when it creates a value for operating losses as a result 
of an acquisition that is greater than the value of those losses to the con-
tinuing business of the target. That value constitutes a tax subsidy of 
acquisitive transactions that violates sound congressional income tax 
policy. 
A carryover basis pattern of taxing an acquisition should produce a tax 
burden on the transferred business in the hands of the acquiring corpora-
tion that replicates the burden that would have been imposed upon the 
target corporation in the absence of the acquisition. No income tax is 
accelerated and the tax attributes of the target corporation survive. 
Under prior law, that equation was frequently disturbed by the ability of 
acquiring corporations to use operating losses at a faster rate than could 
the target corporation from which they were inherited. Since the operat-
ing loss thereby became more valuable to the acquiring corporation than 
it was to the target, the loss itself provided an incentive to the 
acquisition. 
In a recent revision of § 382,6° Congress addressed the distortion of 
normal market forces created by the favorable treatment of operating 
losses in the hands of acquiring corporations. The revised section was 
59 Sophisticated students of this area are fully aware of this net effect of a cost basis election. 
See Yin, Taxing Corporate Liquidations (and Related Matters) After the Tax Reform Act of 
1986, 42 Tax L. Rev. 575, 673 (1987) (election permits "freshening up the [target] losses"). 
60 See Eustice, Carryover of Corporate Tax Attributes, 22 San Diego L. Rev. 117 (1985); 
Jacobs, Tax Treatment of Corporate Net Operating Losses and Other Tax Attribute Carry-
overs, 5 Va. Tax. Rev. 701 (1986). 
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designed expressly to limit the value of transferred operating losses to the 
value the loss had in the hands of the target corporation. That equiva-
lence is sought by not allowing the acquiring corporation in any year to 
use an amount of target losses in excess of an amount equal to a reason-
able rate of return on the value of the target assets. 61 Since that limita-
tion approximates the maximum amount of income that the target itself 
might generate with its own assets, the operating losses cannot be used by 
the acquiring corporation at a faster rate than they could be used by the 
target, and thus, the losses will not have a greater value to the acquiring 
corporation than they did to the target. 62 Under current law, therefore, 
the treatment of transferred losses under a carryover basis system in the 
hands of the acquiring corporation also replicates the treatment of those 
losses in the hands of the target. 
As explored above, cost basis treatment will only be elected when it 
results in a greater after-tax economic benefit to the parties to the acqui-
sition than would carryover basis treatment. Since the tax burden of a 
carryover basis pattern of taxing an acquisition reproduces the tax bur-
den that would have been imposed upon the target corporation in the 
absence of an acquisition, it necessarily follows that electing taxable, cost 
basis treatment produces a reduction in the corporate income tax relative 
to that level of taxation. 
To ensure that business combinations are pursued for reasons that 
have economic justification, the taxing system ought not to provide a tax 
incentive to corporation acquisitions. Under current law, that principle 
of tax neutrality between continuing and acquired businesses is not a 
mere abstract ideal; rather, it has become a firmly established congres-
sional policy. The repeal of the General Utilities doctrine, the revision of 
§ 382, and other related legislation63 all reflect the entirely proper ascen-
sion of that policy of neutrality. 
In an elective system for taxing corporation acquisitions, the cost basis 
election plainly violates that congressional policy. That pattern of taxa-
tion enhances the value of tax attributes in the course of an acquisition 
relative to the value those attributes otherwise would possess had the 
acquisition not occurred. The value so created constitutes a tax subsidy 
for those acquisitions for which a cost basis election produces a favorable 
result. Accordingly, the existence of the cost basis alternative improperly 
reduces the burden of the corporate income tax and serves as an incentive 
to acquisitive corporate behavior. 
61 IRC § 382(b). 
62 H.R. Rep. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-170-71, 188 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 
1986-3 C.B. (vol. 4) 173. 
63 That policy most clearly underlies the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine and the 
revision of§ 382. It also is partly responsible for the adoption of§ 7704 which taxes publicly 
traded partnerships in the same way as the corporations they resemble. 
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The source of that subsidy can be seen from examining more closely 
the conditions under which a cost basis election can create a value for 
operating losses in the course of an acquisition that is greater than the 
value of those losses to a continuing business. Expressed symbolically, a 
cost basis acquisition will be elected only when the value of the basis 
increase to the acquiring corporation (the present value of Br, where r 
equals the marginal rate of tax) reduced by the explicit tax imposed upon 
the target ([B-L]r, since the gain must equal the basis increase) exceeds 
the value of the operating loss to the acquiring corporation (the present 
value of Lr). Thus, a cost basis election will be made if: 
p.v. Br - (B - L)r > p.v. Lr 
or p.v. Br - p.v. Lr > Br - Lr 
or p.v. B - p.v. L > B - L 
The present value of B, the basis increase, will inevitably be smaller than 
the nominal value of B. Thus, in every possible combination of relation-
ships between the size of the operating loss and the basis increase, a cost 
basis election will be rational only if the present value of the operating 
losses to the continuing business of the acquiring corporation is dispro-
portionately reduced relative to the present value of the basis increase. 
That reduction in present value of the operating loss occurs when the 
period of time over which the loss can be deducted is appreciably longer 
than the period over which the basis increase can be depreciated. The 
reason that an operating loss would only be available to the acquiring 
corporation at a rate so much slower than the rate at which basis may be 
used is that the tax law itself imposes legal limitations on the use of losses 
by continuing businesses that do not apply to the tax benefits received in 
cost basis acquisitions. The principal such limitations are of two quite 
different sorts: § 382 and the doctrine of realization. 
The effect of the revised § 382, of course, is to reduce, perhaps materi-
ally, the value of the losses of a target corporation to a profitable acquir-
ing corporation. On the other hand, the ability of a profitable acquiring 
corporation to depreciate or otherwise benefit from the basis increase re-
ceived in a cost basis acquisition is not subject to any similar limitation. 
Accordingly, the principal reason that the losses available in a carryover 
basis acquisition would have a value to the acquiring corporation less 
than the basis adjustment available in a cost basis acquisition is the limi-
tation of § 382 on the ability of the acquiring corporation to use those 
losses.64 
64 Of course, either the target or the acquiring corporation could apply the target loss 
against gain realized on the disposition of business assets. See IRC § 382(h)(l)(A). However, 
to benefit from that use of the loss, the taxpayer would have to actually dispose of the appreci-
ated asset. 
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The§ 382limitation on the use of target losses is amplified by a second 
legal restriction on the use of operating losses. While the period of time 
over which such losses can be used has been generously extended, time 
limitations remain. Thus, in general, losses unused for 15 years following 
the accrual of the original deduction expire. 65 That limitation too is 
evaded by converting the loss to a basis increase. 
Finally, the losses may be of little value to the acquiring corporation 
because the loss is unrealized and is inherent in an asset that the acquir-
ing corporation intends to retain. To a continuing corporation or in a 
carryover basis transaction, those potential losses will be of no value 
whatsoever. 66 Even if the loss is subsequently realized, the value of that 
loss will have been greatly diminished by the deferral of its tax benefit. 
The making of a cost basis election, however, creates a taxable event pur-
suant to which the otherwise unrealized loss may be recognized and used 
to offset the tax on the appreciation in other of the target assets. 
The effect of a cost basis election, therefore, is to create a value in the 
course of an acquisition for the operating and unrealized losses of the 
target corporation that those losses would not otherwise have to the con-
tinuing business of either the target or the acquiring corporation. That 
value is created because the cost basis election permits taxpayers to avoid 
sound legal restrictions67 on the use of both realized and unrealized 
losses. The acceleration of the tax benefit of those losses represents a tax 
subsidy for corporate acquisitions that is inconsistent with the recently 
established congressional policy against providing tax incentives for such 
65 IRC § 172(b)(l)(B). 
66 Moreover, if such a built-in loss is realized after the acquisition, the loss becomes subject 
to the limitations of§ 382. IRC § 382(h)(l)(B)(i). That limitation is similarly avoided by the 
cost basis election. 
67 It might be asserted that § 382 is overly restrictive and that a cost basis election consti-
tutes a reasonable loosening of those rules, rather than an inappropriate evasion. In a taxable, 
cost basis acquisition, the operating losses of the target can be used to wholly eliminate the 
explicit tax imposed upon the transaction. In a carryover basis acquisition, the sale of the 
operating loss functions to offset the implicit tax imposed upon the transaction in much the 
same manner. However, the ability of the target corporation to offset the implicit tax is limited 
by the value of the operating loss to the acquiring corporation. Thus, in contrast to cost basis 
acquisitions, the limitations on the value of the operating losses prevent offsetting the implicit 
tax by an amount determined by the nominal amount of the loss. 
Thus, for example, if the nominal amount of the operating loss to be sold exceeds the unreal-
ized appreciation in the target assets, in a taxable sale, the entire explicit tax could be offset. 
Absent restrictions on the ability of an acquiring corporation in a carryover basis acquisition to 
use that loss in the current year, the value of the loss would equal the implicit tax that would 
otherwise be imposed upon the target. Accordingly, the target could sell the loss for an 
amount that would completely offset the implicit tax. That result, however, is now barred by 
§ 382. 
Under the mandatory carryover basis proposal made here, the problem of even handed 
treatment of cost and carryover basis acquisitions evaporates and the limitations of § 382, 
which appear necessary to prevent tax motivated acquisitions, become unobjectionable. 
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transactions. The inescapable conclusion is that an elective system for 
taxing acquisitions should not be allowed. 
E. Variations on the Theme 
1. Consolidated Losses 
In some circumstances, the losses available to the target to offset the 
gain triggered by a cost basis election could not be transferred to the 
acquiring corporation. Such a case could arise when the losses belonged 
to a consolidated group of corporations of which the target was a mem-
ber, but the losses were not those of the target corporation itself.68 The 
effect of permitting a cost basis election in such a situation is in fact less 
defensible than in the case of nonsubsidiary acquisitions. 
As in the case of nonsubsidiary acquisitions, it is inadequate to view 
the results of the making of a cost basis election as the imposition of a tax 
on the selling group which is properly offset by the operating losses of the 
group. As has been seen, that explicit tax will be incurred voluntarily 
only because it enables the target group to convert a portion of its operat-
ing loss into a more salable asset and thus obtain a higher purchase price 
in the transaction. 
When the loss in question would be transferable to the acquiring cor-
poration, the making of a cost basis election merely constitutes an alter-
native mechanism for accomplishing that transfer. The alternative may 
be objectionable because of its potential for avoiding legal restriction on 
the use of losses by acquiring corporation but the fact of the transfer of 
the operating loss is not itself objectionable. When the loss is not other-
wise transferable, the legal restriction that is avoided by the making of a 
cost basis election is the very restriction on the transferability of the loss. 
Since by hypothesis the loss is not directly related to the business being 
transferred, the operating loss of the target group ought not to accom-
pany the asset transfer and would not do so in a carryover basis acquisi-
tion. However, the mechanism of the cost basis election enables the 
selling group to convert the nontransferable loss of the group into a 
transferable increase in basis that can be sold to the acquiring 
corporation. 
If the cost basis election is an inappropriate mechanism for the sale of 
the operating losses of the business that generated the loss, the election is 
all the more inappropriate as a mechanism for the sale of operating losses 
not generated by the business being transferred. Indeed, since the loss is 
not directly related to the business being sold, the cost basis election 
amounts to little more than a mechanism for permitting the outright sale 
of the operating losses of the target group. Since such a sale is not al-
68 Reg. § 1.1502-79. 
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lowed independently of a corporate acquisition, there is no evident justifi-
cation for permitting that sale in connection with a transfer of a business 
that did not generate the loss in question. Accordingly, the use of cost 
basis elections for the purpose of avoiding restrictions upon the transfera-
bility of losses is also not appropriate. 
2. Stock Acquisitions 
The foregoing discussion has addressed corporate acquisitions in the 
context of a buyer and seller jointly agreeing upon the treatment of the 
acquisition and adjusting the purchase price accordingly. Under present 
law, that context is most nearly represented by the choice in an asset 
acquisition between taxable and reorganization treatment. Under pres-
ent law, however, an express cost basis election is provided following cer-
tain stock purchases. 69 
In the case of a stock acquisition, the parties will negotiate a price for 
the assets to be purchased, corporate stock, that reflects the underlying 
value of the physical assets and of the tax attributes of the target corpora-
tion. However, since both the benefits and burdens of making a cost ba-
sis election relate only to the acquiring corporation, the election ought 
not to affect the shareholders of the target or the purchase price they 
receive for their stock. Nevertheless, precisely the same factors that af-
fected the decision to elect cost basis treatment in an asset acquisition 
will control the decision of the acquiring corporation following a stock 
purchase. The acquiring corporation will make a cost basis election if 
the value to it of the resulting increase in tax basis, reduced by the bur-
den of the accompanying tax liability, will exceed the value of the operat-
ing losses of the target.7° As before, that comparison of values will be 
determined by the relative rates at which the acquiring corporation will 
be able to use the tax deductions attributable to the basis increase or the 
operating loss, respectively. And, as before, the rate at which the operat-
ing loss can be used is limited by the operation of§ 382 and by the pres-
ence of unrealized losses. 
As a result, the function of making a cost basis election in the context 
of a stock acquisition is identical to its function in an asset acquisition. 
The objections to that election developed above, therefore, apply with 
equal force to the stock acquisition variation. 71 
69 IRC § 338(g). 
70 The gain realized upon the making of a § 338 election cannot be offset by the losses of the 
consolidated group of which the acquiring corporation is a member. IRC § 338(h)(9). 
71 Either at present or in the future, a cost basis election might be desired because the bur-
den of the tax to the target was reduced by a preference or allowance other than operating loss 
carryovers. In particular, if a preferential rate of tax on capital gains were reintroduced, the 
present value of the tax benefits of a cost basis election might for that reason exceed the result-
ing tax burden. However, in an elective system for taxing acquisitions, the propriety of al-
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F. Transactional Elections 
For simplicity of illustration, this article has addressed expressly elec-
tive treatment at the corporate level that is presently provided by § 338 
and would be extended under the proposals of the American Law Insti-
tute. However, the conclusion that elective taxation of acquisitions 
should not be allowed is not so limited. If the making of a cost basis 
election constitutes, in the current tax environment, an impermissible 
avoidance of sound legal restrictions on the ability to market operating 
and built-in losses, then all such elections ought to be prohibited, regard-
less of the form the election takes. Whether a cost basis acquisition is 
elected by filing a document or making an immaterial change in the form 
of the transaction is of no significance. Thus, the argument here that 
expressly elective treatment ought not be extended to the parties does not 
constitute an endorsement of the broad features of the existing rules. 
Rather, the rejection of that express election necessarily entails a rejec-
tion of the transactional election contained in current law. 
Transactional elections, and the arbitrary definitions that produce 
them, are objectionable for a second reason; one that is nearly the reverse 
of the first. Rigid and complex definitions, not based upon an underlying 
financial reality, greatly increase the cost and difficulty of complying with 
the provisions of the taxing system and create harsh traps for the insuffi-
ciently cautious taxpayer. A stock acquisition, for example, that is in-
tended to be a carryover basis acquisition by virtue of the reorganization 
provisions may be converted to a taxable acquisition at the shareholder 
level by the unintended receipt of a trivial cash consideration by one of 
the target shareholders. 72 The acquisition may be made taxable at both 
the corporate and shareholder levels by the subsequent liquidation of the 
target into the acquiring corporation because of the nonrational distinc-
tions in the reorganization definitions of stock and asset acquisitions. 73 
lowing a basis increase to an acquiring corporation at the cost of a tax sheltered by preferences 
of the target is no greater than the propriety of converting target losses into a basis increase. 
The capital gains preference is designed to reduce the burden of the otherwise prevailing rate 
of tax for some reason Congress deems sufficient. In an elective system, a taxpayer would elect 
to be subject to capital gains taxation only if the resulting tax burden were lower than in a 
nonrecognition carryover basis transaction. The justification for such a use of the preference is 
difficult to find. 
Using an analysis analogous to that in the text, it can be demonstrated that in this context, 
a cost basis election merely permits the target to sell its tax preferences to the acquiring corpo-
ration. Such a transaction plainly exceeds the legitimate bounds of the original grant of the 
preference to the target corporation and should not be allowed. 
72 Chapman v. Commissioner, 618 F.2d 856 (1st Cir. 1980). 
73 For example, while prior ownership of stock in the target is no bar to a B reorganization, 
it is a bar to a C reorganization. See Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 
75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 835 (1959). Accordingly, the prompt liquidation of the 
target following a good B reorganization under these circumstances could result in a bad C 
reorganization. 
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The presence of these arbitrary definitional provisions in the law may 
be of benefit to taxpayers desiring to make transactional elections-per-
haps well after the consummation of the acquisition. Perhaps just as 
commonly, however, they can be injurious to taxpayers seeking in good 
faith to comply with the complex and irrational requirements of present 
law. The elimination of multiple definitional lines that do not reflect un-
derlying economic differences would greatly simplify and rationalize 
these rules. 
III. TowARDS MANDATORY TREATMENT 
The rejection of elective treatment of corporate acquisitions requires 
the adoption of a mandatory scheme of taxation. In principle, the opti-
mum mandatory pattern might be either a single pattern of taxation ap-
plicable to all acquisitions, either a fully taxable cost basis, or a 
nonrecognition carryover basis pattern, or a pattern in which cost and 
carryover basis consequences were assigned to transactions that are 
clearly distinguishable on the basis of substantial nontax factors. 
The most important criterion for selecting a pattern for taxing corpo-
rate acquisitions is that the resulting tax burden be logically and fairly 
related to the other broad features of the taxing system. 74 A corporate 
acquisition is merely one form of economic behavior subject to the provi-
sions of the tax laws, and the treatment of that form of activity ought not 
be disproportionate to other applications of the taxing system. In the 
context of a corporate acquisition, the development of a rational pattern 
of taxation requires reconciling the inherent inconsistencies between the 
taxation of stock and asset acquisitions created by the separate entity, 
double tax system. Further, the resulting system must successfully dis-
tinguish between transactions that are essentially dispositive, and thus 
taxable, and those that are essentially a nontaxable continuation of a 
business activity. 
The decision to impose a mandatory pattern of taxation on all acquisi-
tions, however, implies constraints beyond fairness and rationality. In 
sharp contrast to the transactional and express elections permitted under 
current law, a mandatory system requires a clear and defensible defini-
tion of the set of transactions that are to be subject to the mandatory 
system. Absent such a definition, the system will remain elective. It is 
therefore to the derivation of such a definition that attention should first 
be turned. 
74 Other criteria can be imagined. If, for example, Congress desired to retard the pace of 
corporate acquisitions and determined to use the tax laws to promote that objective, a different 
scheme for taxing acquisitions would emerge. Such nontax policy criteria are not considered 
herein. 
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Statutory definitions normally do not, and ought not to, drive the se-
lection of the pattern of taxing the activity defined. However, in the tax-
ation of acquisitions, it will be seen that the potential for definition does 
have implications for the selection of the substantive tax rules. Thus, the 
process of defining the corporate acquisitions that are to be subject to the 
mandatory pattern of taxation also suggests what that pattern is to be. 
A. Defining the Acquisition 
The universe of possibly relevant corporate transactions is best viewed 
as a continuum stretching from the sale of a single asset to the sale of a 
single share of stock. At some point on that continuum, a sufficient 
quantity of assets, or of stock, has been transferred for the transaction to 
become recognizable as an acquisition. That acquisitive transaction, 
however, may only be faintly distinguishable from the adjoining, nonac-
quisitive point on the continuum. Moreover, under our separate entity, 
double tax system, there are points on that continuum that are unavoid-
ably carryover basis transactions-minor sales of stock - and points that 
are unavoidably cost basis transactions-the sale of a single asset. Ac-
cordingly, regardless of how an acquisition is defined, the definition will 
encompass a range of transactions on a continuum that is adjoined on 
one side by a cost basis transaction and on the other by a carryover basis 
transaction. The process of defining an acquisition, therefore, is one of 
drawing one or more definitional lines between cost and carryover basis 
acquisitions. 
To implement a mandatory system of taxing corporate acquisitions, 
the definitional line that is drawn must reflect, to the maximum extent 
possible, an underlying economic distinction. Unless all economically 
similar transactions are subject to the same pattern of taxation, the sys-
tem will remain elective: Through making an economically insignificant 
alternation in the form of a transaction, taxpayers could achieve a differ-
ent tax result. Accordingly, the adoption of a mandatory pattern of taxa-
tion requires identifying the most significant discontinuities in the 
continuum of corporate transactions. Only at that point, or points, can 
an enforceable line between cost and carryover transactions be drawn. 
Deriving enforceable definitional lines is not only essential to the im-
plementation of a mandatory system, it is essential to the fairness of that 
system. Under a mandatory pattern of taxation, transactions that are not 
meaningfully distinguishable ought not to be subject to different tax bur-
dens. If a mandatory system were based upon an arbitrary definition of 
an acquisition, radically different income tax consequences would attach 
to economically insignificant differences in the form of the transaction. 
Such "cliff effect" provisions are intrinsically unfair if unavoidable, or 
they create transactional elections if they are susceptible to taxpayer ma-
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nipulation. Thus, insisting upon a definition of a corporate acquisition 
based upon economic distinctions ensures, not only that the mandated 
tax will not be avoidable, but also that the tax will be fairly imposed. 
1. Distinguishing Asset and Stock Acquisitions 
At the very midpoint of the continuum of corporate transactions, the 
purchase of substantially all of the assets of a business meets the purchase 
of substantially of the stock in the corporate owner of the business. The 
formal distinction between these acquisitive techniques has seemed to 
suggest that a definitional line could be drawn at this point-as occurs 
under present law. In fact, however, the underlying economic distinc-
tions between stock and asset acquisitions are far too trivial, and the 
choice between these forms too completely within the control of the par-
ties, to provide a definitional basis for a mandatory system of taxing 
acquisitions. 
At this intermediate point on the continuum, either form of transac-
tion results in the complete transfer of the ownership of the business ac-
tivities of the target and the resulting combination of the business of the 
target and the acquiring corporations. Thus, the end results of stock and 
asset acquisitions are essentially identical. 75 Moreover, the parties to an 
acquisition have a high degree of freedom to select between stock and 
asset acquisitions. In practice, that choice is largely controlled by the 
relative convenience of the various available acquisition techniques and 
little of substance is affected by that decision.76 Under these circum-
stances, distinguishing among acquisitions depending upon whether 
stock or assets were purchased would be to create a transactiom11 election 
of minimal burden. It is significant that those commentators who appear 
to favor a retention of the general pattern of present law with its distinc-
tion between stock and asset acquisition do so with ready acceptance of 
the transactional election that approach creates. 77 In the context of elec-
tive treatment, the relatively minor nontax differences between stock and 
asset acquisitions might be thought sufficient to justify different patterns 
of taxation as occurs under present law. Even if that is so, however, 
those differences are clearly not sufficient to provide the definitional basis 
of a mandatory system, the purpose of which is to prevent transactional 
elections. 
75 See Senate Report on Subchapter C, note 9, at 45-46. 
76 See B. Bittker & J. Eustice, Fed. Income Tax'n of Corporations and Shareholders 1! 
14.05 (5th ed. 1987). 
77 See Posin, Taxing Corporate Reorganizations: Purging Penelope's Web, 133 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1335, 1398 (1985); Shores, Letters to the Editor, Section 338-Do We Need a Change? 
A Response to Professor Yin, 37 Tax Notes 939 (Nov. 30, 1987). 
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The absence of a meaningful distinction between stock and asset acqui-
sitions is forcefully evidenced by the blending of the forms of acquisitions 
that occurs in practice and the resulting difficulty in even factually distin-
guishing between stock and asset acquisitions. For example, not uncom-
monly, an acquisition may be commenced with the acquisition of a 
significant block of the stock of the target, perhaps a majority of out-
standing shares, but completed as a merger or other form of asset trans-
fer. Similarly, a simple stock acquisition followed by the prompt 
liquidation of the target corporation has always been treated under our 
taxing system as a asset acquisition. 78 On the other hand, the merger of 
the target corporation-essentially an asset transfer-with a subsidiary 
of the acquiring corporation will be treated as a stock acquisition if the 
target survives the merger.79 Since, factually, the line between stock and 
asset acquisitions is scarcely perceptible, that line cannot have any rele-
vance to a mandatory system of taxing corporate acquisitions. 
For all of these reasons, it has historically been understood that stock 
and asset acquisitions merely represented different legal techniques for 
accomplishing the same economic result and that it was wholly inappro-
priate for the taxing system to prescribe materially different tax conse-
quences to these different forms of the same transaction. One of the 
major achievements of the 1954 recodification was to minimize the tax 
consequences of the business choice between taxable asset and stock ac-
quisitions. Similarly, the reorganization provisions of the Code have al-
ways extended comparable treatment to stock and asset acquisitions. 
The deviation under present law from this traditional treatment of acqui-
sitions should be eliminated; stock and asset acquisitions should be made 
subject to the same pattern of taxation. 
2. Stock Acquisitions 
In our system of taxation, corporations are quite rigorously treated as 
entities wholly separate from their owners and income taxes are imposed 
at both the corporate and shareholder levels. In that world, the sale of a 
single share of stock has no corporate level implications whatsoever. It 
could be otherwise. In the taxation of partnerships, the sale of a partner-
ship interest can result in basis adjustments at the entity level that are 
designed to ensure that the element of gain taxed at the partner level is 
not again subject to tax. 80 However, until conduit taxation replaces the 
separate entity, double tax system for corporations, the transfer of corpo-
rate stock is inherently a carryover basis transaction at the corporate 
78 Rev. Rul. 67-274, 1967-2 C.B. 141. 
79 Rev. Rul. 74-565, 1974-2 C.B. 125. 
so IRC § 743. 
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level.81 
Simply because the transfer of one share of stock cannot have corpo-
rate level implications does not mean, of course, that some greater trans-
fer could not have different income tax consequences. However, whether 
the acquisition of a specified percentage of the stock of a corporation 
could constitute a workable definition of a corporate acquisition for the 
purposes of implementing a mandatory system of taxation depends upon 
the underlying financial significance of whatever percentage is specified. 
If the definitional percentage lacks economic significance, taxpayers will 
be free to purchase a greater or lesser amount and thereby alter the tax 
consequences of the acquisition without economic sacrifice. As a result, 
the mandatory system could be avoided and taxpayers would retain a 
transactional election. 
If the mandatory pattern of taxation selected was nonrecognition car-
ryover basis, there would be no occasion to attempt a definition of a cor-
porate acquisition in terms of stock transfers for the purpose of the 
corporate level tax. No acquisition of stock, regardless of the degree of 
ownership involved, would produce consequences at the corporate level 
any different from the sale of a single share of stock. Accordingly, an 
inquiry into the potential for defining an acquisition by reference to stock 
transfers is relevant only if a cost basis pattern of taxation is to be 
mandated. 
Corporate acquisitions have traditionally been defined in terms of the 
acquisition or possession of a specified level, typically 80%, of the stock 
of the target corporation. 82 However, even in an elective system of taxa-
tion, stock based definitions are not satisfactory because of the almost 
infinite variety of acquisitive forms. In the mandatory system proposed 
here, such a definition of a corporate acquisition would be entirely un-
workable. There are three principal types of difficulties in attempting to 
define acquisitions in terms of stock transfers. 
81 It has generally been assumed, at least until recently, that the transaction costs of imple-
menting such a conduit tax system for large, publicly traded entities would be prohibitive. The 
very form of business organization and the needs of the capital markets seemed to require the 
application of the separate entity approach to at least large corporations. Some doubt may 
have been cast upon that time honored assumption by the quite recent, but apparently brief, 
history of publicly traded partnerships. See IRC § 7704. Evidently, in some circumstances the 
benefits from avoiding the corporate level tax are sufficiently large to outweigh the cost and 
complexity of conduit taxation. Nevertheless, while perhaps tolerable, the conduit system of 
taxing partnerships is enormously unwieldy when applied to widely held entities in which the 
ownership interests change hands with a high degree of frequency. Even if such a system could 
be imposed upon all corporations, the inefficiency and inconvenience of such an approach 
should preclude the effort. Thus, it seems axiomatic that the sale of a single share of stock, at 
least in public corporations, cannot have corporate level consequences. 
82 See IRC §§ 368(a)(l)(B), (a)(l)(C) (reorganization), 338(d)(3) (taxable stock purchase). 
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a. Complex Corporate Structures 
The ownership of a corporation can be divided among a variety of 
classes of stock bearing different voting and economic interests. Thus, 
the definition of the level of stock ownership required for an acquisition 
must address both of these factors. Present law is not consistent in that 
effort83 and the range of approaches demonstrates the perhaps surprising 
difficulty of the task. 
The problem can be illustrated with the simple case of a corporation 
having outstanding an equal number of shares of each of two classes of 
common stock, one voting and one nonvoting, but otherwise identical. 
For the illustration, assume that the required level of ownership change 
for an acquisition to have occurred is 67%. If the definition addresses 
just voting power, it would be possible for the acquiring corporation to 
own 83% of the economic interest in the target without producing an 
acquisition by acquiring all the nonvoting stock and 66% of the voting. 
On the other hand, an acquisition might occur, notwithstanding that the 
acquiring corporation owned only 34% of the economic interests in the 
corporation, if it acquired 67% of just the voting stock. 
If the definition addressed the total value of all shares, it would be 
possible for the acquiring corporation to hold 100% of the voting power 
and 66% of the economic interest in the target without creating an acqui-
sition. However, an acquisition might occur, although the acquiring cor-
poration held only 34% of the voting power in the target, if it owned all 
of the nonvoting stock. Further, if the definition separately addressed 
both voting power and the value (or number) of nonvoting shares and 
required obtaining 67% of each, the acquiring corporation could own 
100% of the voting power and 83% of the economic interests in the tar-
get without causing an acquisition to occur. In each instance, the line so 
drawn between acquisition and nonacquisition transactions would be 
wholly arbitrary for there would be no economically meaningful distinc-
tion between transactions that just exceeded or just fell short of that defi-
nition. Each definition would be under-inclusive and most would also be 
over-inclusive. Accordingly, each definition would permit a transac-
tional election. 84 
Moreover, were this definitional problem to be surmounted, taxpayers 
could attack the result through more complex corporate structures. For 
example, the acquisition of only 51% of the target corporation might not 
result in an acquisition, but would result in complete control over the 
83 Compare § 368(c) (vote and number of nonvoting), with § 1504(a)(2) (vote and value of 
aU), and § 304(c) (vote or value of aU). 
84 For an unsuccessful attempt to manipulate a definition of control geared to 50% owner-
ship, see Garlock, Inc. v. Commissioner, 489 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 
911 (1974). 
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subsidiaries of the target corporation. Similar techniques have greatly 
complicated the effort to tax currently income earned by controlled for-
eign corporations. 85 
b. Partial Ownership 
A stock based definition must, of course, specify the level of ownership 
required for an acquisition. However, the higher the level of required 
ownership specified, such as 80%, the less meaningful the definition be-
comes. Since acquiring corporations may completely dominate subsidi-
aries through far lower levels of ownership, the acquiring corporation 
can obtain all meaningful rights of ownership in the target without pre-
cipitating an acquisition. Without doubt, the 80% ownership commonly 
specified under current law lacks any underlying economic significance. 
Indeed, it is generally recognized that the high 80% requirement of cur-
rent law implements a transactional election. 86 
On the other hand, the lower the level specified in the definition, the 
less appropriate it becomes to impose the income tax consequences of a 
cost basis acquisition. Under § 382, restrictions are imposed upon the 
ability to use operating losses when there has been only a 50% change in 
the ownership of the loss corporation. 87 However, that restriction is not 
designed to impair the value of the operating loss to the target corpora-
tion; rather, the limitation is designed to permit the use of the loss at a 
rate consistent with the ability of the target to use the loss prior to the 
change in ownership. 88 To treat that level of ownership change as a cost 
basis acquisition would impose an unacceptably harsher penalty on the 
shareholders of the target: the operating loss would be destroyed and a 
corporate level tax imposed upon the entire appreciation in the assets of 
the target corporation. Equally, it would not seem appropriate to allow a 
full step up in the tax basis for the assets of the target merely because of a 
50% change in ownership. Presumably for that reason, a 50% owner-
ship test has historically been used to define corporate control in Code 
sections designed to bar various abuses, 89 but the higher 80% threshold 
has been employed to define an acquisition. Yet, the 80% requirement 
clearly creates a transactional election. 
These difficulties, which are inherent in any stock based definition of 
an acquisition, cannot be avoided by the imposition of a partial tax, con-
~s See IRC §§ 1296 through 1297. And see Jelsma, Understanding PFICs and QEFs, 14 
Int'l Tax J. 317 (1988). 
86 For the classic illustration, see Granite Trust Co. v. United States, 238 F.2d 670 (1st Cir. 
1956). 
87 IRC § 382(g)(l). 
88 See text accompanying notes 60-62. 
89 See, e.g., IRC §§ 304, 368(a)(2)(H). 
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forming to the degree of ownership change, or a partial basis adjustment. 
The ultimate benefits and burdens of either full or partial tax conse-
quences would fall equally on the acquiring corporation and upon the 
shareholders of the target who did not dispose of their stock. 
A greater significance for whatever level of stock ownership is specified 
could be created by attaching other income tax consequences to that level 
of ownership. For example, the level specified might be identical to the 
ownership level required for the filing of consolidated income tax re-
turns90 or for the complete exemption from tax for intercorporate divi-
dends.91 To the extent that the significance of these unrelated tax 
consequences to an acquiring corporation approached the significance of 
the choice between a cost or carryover basis acquisition, the freedom to 
engage in a transactional election would be constrained. However, for 
acquiring corporations unconcerned by such functionally unrelated tax 
effects, the ability to elect would be unaffected. More importantly, tax-
payers would be able to obtain the collateral consequences of ownership 
while avoiding a cost basis acquisition through multiple stage 
acquisitions. 
c. Creeping Acquisitions 
Stock acquisitions need not occur through a single transaction; the tar-
get stock may be acquired in a series of transactions extending over sev-
eral years. A stock based definition of an acquisition must therefore 
either require that the acquisition of the specified level of ownership oc-
cur in a single step, or treat as an acquisition obtaining the specified level 
of ownership through a series of perhaps minor and unrelated acquisi-
tions. Thus, the acquiring corporation may have purchased 65% of the 
target stock in 1980. Ten years later an additional 5% might be ac-
quired. If such "creeping" acquisitions fell within the definition and the 
specified ownership level were 67%, the relatively minor, second stage 
purchase would result in a cost basis acquisition with a corporate level 
tax on the entire appreciation in the target assets and an adjustment to 
the basis of those assets. Historically, that consequence has never been 
thought appropriate; the tax consequences of that approach are too far-
reaching for such a minor stock purchase. Rather, the tax system quite 
correctly has always required that stock acquisitions that could result in 
cost basis adjustments be made during a brief period of time, such as one 
year.92 Creeping acquisitions have only been recognized in carryover ba-
sis reorganization type acquisitions in which there are no corporate level 
90 A coordination presently contained in § 338(d)(3) which defines the required level of 
stock purchase with a cross-reference to § 1504(a)(2). 
91 IRC § 243. 
92 See § 338(h)(l) which continues the identical requirement of prior law. 
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consequences. 93 Continuing that pattern of existing law would require 
that a corporate acquisition that resulted in cost basis treatment must 
occur in a single transaction. 
The single transaction requirement, however, is not consistent with a 
mandatory pattern of taxation. Taxpayers wishing to avoid the conse-
quences of an acquisition could, with relative ease, structure multiple 
stage acquisitions which, on the one hand, would avoid cost basis conse-
quences and, on the other, would ultimately result in all other tax and 
nontax benefits of complete ownership.94 
Plainly, it is possible to define corporation acquisitions in terms of the 
transfer of possession of a defined level of stock ownership. However, 
that definition of an acquisition is not suitable in implementing a 
mandatory pattern of taxation in which the acquisition of that level of 
ownership would be treated as a cost basis acquisition. It is simply not 
possible to draw a meaningful, nonarbitrary line that distinguishes one 
level of stock acquisition from another. Thus, in a mandatory system, all 
stock acquisitions should be treated identically. Since the sale of a single 
share does not have corporate level consequences, it follows that no stock 
transfers should have corporate level consequences. Stock transfers in 
any quantity are inherently carryover basis transactions. 
3. Asset Acquisitions 
In contrast to the sale of stock in a corporation, the sale of a single 
asset by a corporation does have corporate level income tax conse-
quences, but does not have immediate shareholder level implications. 
Moreover, the current imposition of an income tax on asset transfers in 
the ordinary course of business is essential to the very concept of a corpo-
rate income tax. Thus, asset transfers are inherently and unavoidably 
cost basis transactions. 
93 See § l.368-2(c) of the regulations. 
94 Other definitional problems created by creeping acquisitions have plagued existing Jaw 
and ought be avoided to the extent possible. For example, at present, the acquisition of 80% of 
the stock of a target corporation may be treated as a reorganization even if the stock is not 
acquired at one time but rather in a series of transactions occurring over a one-year period. In 
that event, all of the tendering target shareholders would be entitled to nonrecognition treat-
ment. Similarly, a reorganization will occur upon the acquisition of sufficient stock to produce 
the required 80% control even if the acquiring corporation previously owned a block of stock, 
say 50%, in the target. Of course, in that event, only the shareholders of the target who 
tendered their stock in the final acquisition are entitled to nonrecognition treatment. But, 
what should be the result if the acquiring corporation obtains all of the stock of the target 
pursuant to a single plan, but the acquisition occurs on two days separated by 18 months? 
Surprisingly perhaps, one court has held that the transaction did not constitute a reorganiza-
tion and that no shareholder was entitled to nonrecognition treatment. American Potash & 
Chern. Corp. v. United States, 399 F.2d 194 (Ct. Cl. 1968). 
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In theory, it is possible to conceive of a system in which all intercorpo-
rate asset transfers were carryover basis transactions. However, the ef-
fect of such a system would be to defer the application of the income tax 
until the asset left corporate solution, if ever. The result would be to 
extend a major subsidy to incorporated business, as compared to the cur-
rently taxed unincorporated business, and to subsidize corporations sell-
ing goods to other corporations, as compared to corporations selling to 
the public or providing services. None of that makes any sense at all and 
would be entirely unacceptable. To the contrary, the demands of an in-
come tax system require that sales in the ordinary course of business be 
subject to immediate taxation. If all corporate acquisitions were treated 
as cost basis transactions, there thus would be no need to distinguish 
among types of asset transfers. However, if the selected mandatory pat-
tern of taxation were carryover basis, it would be necessary to divide 
asset transfers between acquisitive and nonacquisitive transactions. 
In contrast to the sale of a financial asset like stock, it is possible in 
principle to discriminate among sales of real assets in a manner that re-
flects a substantial underlying economic difference. The transfer of a 
bundle of assets either will or will not include all of the properties neces-
sary to the conduct of an income producing enterprise. The transfer, 
that is, will either be of an existing business enterprise or of something 
less, the product of the business activity or a component of the business 
assets. That distinction between the transfer of an entire business and the 
transfer of something less has a substantial economic significance that 
reflects normal business practice and is well understood by the financial 
community. While borderline cases of course exist or can be manufac-
tured, virtually all asset transfers quite clearly constitute either a recur-
ring disposition by the business of a portion of its properties or a 
disposition of the business itself. Accordingly, a material discontinuity 
exists in the continuum of asset transfers that does not exist in stock 
acquisitions. 
4. Proposed Definition and Taxation of an Acquisition 
Because of the presence of an economically significant discontinuity in 
asset transfers, a basis exists for developing an enforceable definition of a 
corporate acquisition. In principle, it would be entirely feasible to treat 
the transfer of substantially all of the assets of an existing business ven-
ture as an acquisition subject to the pattern of taxation that Congress 
selects to impose on those transactions. Conversely, transfers of less, 
nonacquisitive transfers, would remain subject to the pattern of taxation 
normally imposed upon transactions occurring in the ordinary course of 
business. 
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Defining corporate acquisitions solely by reference to asset transfers 
amounting to the transfer of an entire business activity and not by refer-
ence to stock transfers requires treating all acquisitions as carryover basis 
transactions. The transfer of assets by a corporation consisting of less 
than a business activity would remain a fully taxable, cost basis transac-
tion. However, the balance of the continuum of corporation transactions 
would universally be treated as carryover basis transactions at the corpo-
rate level. Thus, sales of stock, without regard to the proportion of out-
standing stock involved, would not produce corporate level consequences 
and would be carryover basis transactions. Similarly, the transfer of a 
going business through a sale of assets, rather than a sale of stock, would 
be taxed in the same manner. Regardless of the character of the consid-
eration received by the target corporation,95 the transfer would not be 
subject to tax at the corporate level and the acquiring corporation would 
assume the tax attributes of the target, including tax basis and loss 
carryovers. 
a. Compatibility with Present Law 
Defining corporate acquisitions in terms of the transfer of an entire 
business activity does not require the development of a new income tax 
concept. Existing, not uncommonly encountered provisions of the cur-
rent Code governing transactions closely related to acquisitions extend 
favorable income tax consequences to the transfer or retention of a level 
of assets sufficient to constitute a business activity. In particular, § 355 
of the Code permits the tax-free division of a single corporation, but only 
along lines that represent entire business activities.96 Using the line al-
ready drawn by § 355 to define transfers that are to be treated as acquisi-
tions would permit incorporating the accumulated experience under that 
provision represented by a developed body of case law97 and regulatory 
9s Permitting the nonrecognition receipt of cash also determines the treatment of the as-
sumption of recourse liabilities of the target corporation regardless of whether the liabilities 
exceeded the basis of the target assets. The purchase price in a carryover basis acquisition 
should be adjusted to reflect the value of such assumed liabilities. However, the price would 
not be adjusted to reflect the amount of nonrecourse liabilities in excess of the value of the 
properties they encumber. Accordingly, the target would not incur an implicit tax attributable 
to that excess portion of the borrowing which it would never repay. Properly, the excess of a 
nonrecourse debt over the value of property transferred in an acquisition should be treated as 
taxable cancellation of indebtedness income and not gain from the sale of property entitled to 
nonrecognition. The decision in Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983), confuses that 
result. See Coven, Limiting Losses Attributable to Nonrecourse Debt: A Defense of the 
Traditional System Against the At-Risk Concept, 74 Calif. L. Rev. 41, 75-79 (1986). 
96 IRC § 355(b). See also IRC § 302(e)(2) (safe harbor rule for partial liquidation). 
97 See B. Bittker & J. Eustice, Fed. Income Tax'n of Corporations and Shareholders, 11 
13.04 (5th ed. 1987). In fact, the active business test might better serve to distinguish acquisi-
tions than it has served to distinguish corporate divisions. See Lee, Functional Divisions and 
Other Corporate Separations Under Section 355 After Rafferty, 27 Tax L. Rev. 453 (1972). 
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definitions. 9 8 
Whether the sale of a business would in fact constitute an acceptable 
basis for defining a corporation acquisition subject to a mandatory pat-
tern of taxation depends upon the ease with· which taxpayers could ma-
nipulate their transactions to avoid that definition. Under a mandatory 
carryover basis pattern of taxing acquisitions, the primary source of pres-
sure on the definitional line can be anticipated from taxpayers seeking to 
fit within the mandatory scheme. 99 If taxpayers were able to convert 
significant numbers of ordinary business transactions into carryover basis 
dispositions, the corporate income tax would be unduly deferred and its 
effect improperly diminished. The incentive for such attempts would be 
greatest in the transfer of property generating little, if any, cost recovery 
allowances; in that event, the purchase price would be relatively unaf-
fected by the receipt of a carryover basis. Attempts, however, to treat 
portions of a business as a complete business activity factually would du-
plicate the efforts under current law to achieve a tax-free division of a 
business activity. Under present law, most of the pressure on the statu-
tory definition has come from efforts by small, closely held businesses to 
segregate portions of a single business activity in various corporations 
under common ownership. 100 Thus, that effort to exploit the definition of 
a corporate acquisition would directly face the existing state of the law 
under § 355 and the viable distinctions drawn by that provision. 
Concededly, the proposed definitional line, under current law or in the 
future, can never achieve crystal clarity; taxpayers desiring to alter the 
consequences of their transaction would not be deprived of all possible 
avenues of manipulation. However, because of the accumulated experi-
ence under § 355 and similar provisions, the existing tax law does con-
tain a developed and discernible line between the transfer of a bundle of 
assets that constitute a business and the transfer of something less. That 
line could be used to create a workable definition of a corporate acquisi-
tion. Moreover, upon reviewing the continuum of corporate transactions 
from the sale of a single asset to the sale of a single share of stock, only 
one discontinuity that could serve as the basis for an enforceable defini-
98 Prop. Reg. § 1.355-3. 
99 Taxpayers may seek to avoid the mandatory scheme by dismembering a business activity 
and selling portions of the business in taxable transactions. For that strategy to be successful, 
however, the taxpayers would have to receive greater net proceeds from a series of taxable sales 
of portions of a going business, after the application of operating losses, than they would from 
a nontaxable, carryover basis disposition of the entire business. It seems unlikely that many 
taxpayers would benefit from such an approach. If not, there should be little pressure on a 
mandatory carryover basis scheme from taxpayers seeking to avoid its consequences. 
By contrast, there would be considerable effort by taxpayers seeking to avoid a mandatory 
cost basis scheme. That a carryover basis approach will correspond to the desires of most 
taxpayers in the current tax environment will enhance the success of that approach. 
too See e.g., King v. Commissioner, 458 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1972). 
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tion of a corporate acquisition emerges. A distinction based upon the 
transfer of an entire business activity is the definitional line that is, at the 
very least, the most defensible in practice of all possible lines. 
b. Shareholder Level Requirements 
The proposed definition of a corporate acquisition does not include 
any reference to the nature of the consideration received by the target 
corporation or its shareholders or the extent to which the shareholders of 
the target remain as shareholders of the acquiring corporation. Under a 
mandatory system of taxing corporate acquisitions, the tax consequences 
at the corporate level cannot be affected by shareholder level transac-
tions. Were such a connection to exist, the corporate level tax would not 
be mandatory, rather, it would vary as a function of the shareholder level 
event. For example, continuing the requirement of present law that, in a 
reorganization type asset acquisition, the consideration received by the 
shareholders of the target must consist solely of stock of the acquiring 
corporation (or its parent) would permit the parties to elect or avoid cost 
basis treatment by the use of a nominal cash consideration. 101 
Under current law, carryover basis treatment for asset acquisitions is 
available only in a reorganization where the consideration received by 
the shareholders of the target must consist of stock in the acquiring cor-
poration.102 However, and somewhat inconsistently, carryover basis 
treatment is always available following a stock acquisition, regardless of 
the nature of the consideration. The proposal here is, in general effect, to 
extend to asset transfers that comprise an entire business the carryover 
basis treatment that presently extends to stock acquisitions. That paral-
lel treatment is entirely consistent with sound income tax policy. To the 
extent that stock and asset transfers produce essentially identical eco-
nomic results, differences in tax treatment are improper. Accordingly, it 
is entirely appropriate to define carryover basis acquisitions without ref-
erence to the nature of the consideration paid by the acquiring corpora-
tion. In this respect, the proposal here is similar to the proposals of the 
American Law Institute pursuant to which the corporate level conse-
quences of an acquisition would not depend upon the nature of the con-
sideration received by the target shareholders. 103 
101 The extent to which the treatment of the shareholders should depend upon the treatment 
of the corporation is a separate question and is considered below. 
102 See John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374 (1935); Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 
568. See also text accompanying notes 69-77. 
IOJ Subchapter C Project, note 9, at 167. Proposal D1 would allow nonrecognition treat-
ment to any shareholder receiving stock in an acquiring corporation incident to an acquisition 
without regard to the character of the consideration received by the other shareholders. Thus, 
the proposal would dispense with the judicial continuity of the proprietary interest doctrine. 
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c. Neutrality of the Business Activity Test 
The proposed definition line receives justification, not only from con-
siderations of expediency, but also from considerations of tax principles. 
Defining corporate acquisitions in terms of asset transfers permits that 
definition to encompass the transfer of all economically identical business 
activities without regard to the legal technicalities of the form of owner-
ship of those activities. Under such a definition, the transfer of an entire 
business would be treated as an acquisition regardless of whether that 
business activity was the sole activity of the target corporation, was one 
of several divisions operated by the target, or was owned by a subsidiary 
of the target parent. As a result, such a definition would possess a high 
degree of neutrality among forms of business organization. 
By contrast, defining acquisitions in terms of stock transfers would, in 
the absence of an elaborate set of additional rules, be highly non-neutral 
across forms of business organization. Under such a definition, the dis-
position of an entire business activity would not be treated as an acquisi-
tion if that activity were conducted as a division, notwithstanding that 
the transfer of an identical bundle of assets would be treated as an acqui-
sition if they were the only assets of the target. Worse, the transfer of 
those same assets would presumably be treated as an acquisition if the 
target held those assets in a wholly-owned subsidiary, rather than as a 
division-an economically irrelevant distinction. That result would be 
unsound. The transfer of a bundle of properties that constitutes a busi-
ness activity, and might have been conducted as the entire activity of a 
corporation, ought to be treated as an acquisition and taxed in a manner 
consistent with all other transfers of comparable bundles of assets. A 
contrary rule places too high a premium upon otherwise unnecessary 
advance tax planning and encourages taxpayers to engage in pointless 
restructuring of their business organizations in anticipation of an 
acquisition. 
Historically, asset acquisitions have been defined in terms of the acqui-
sition of "substantially all" of the assets of the target corporation.104 
That more restrictive requirement was adopted for the purpose of con-
forming the scope of an asset acquisition to the scope of a stock acquisi-
tion pursuant to which, of course, all assets would be acquired. 
Unfortunately, that definition imposed upon asset transfers the same ir-
rational inconsistencies that infect the definition of a stock acquisition. 
In fact, that aspect of the definition of an asset acquisition has been re-
sponsible for much of the irrationality in the taxation of reorganizations. 
For example, the division of a single corporation in anticipation of an 
acquisition has barred reorganization treatment for a subsequent asset 
104 IRC § 368(a)(l)(C), (2)(D), and (2)(E)(i). See also Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568, 
569. 
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acquisition because the substantially all test was applied to the historic 
assets of the target, 105 although no principle of tax policy would be of-
fended by permitting reorganization treatment of the acquisition of one 
of the corporations resulting from the division. 106 Without question, the 
substantially all assets requirement of present law is a source of irration-
ality that ought to be eliminated in any reform of these provisions and 
would not provide a satisfactory basis for defining an acquisition. 
5. Enforcement: Scope of the Definition 
If assets, once incorporated, could never leave corporate solution, en-
forcing a mandatory carryover basis scheme, given a workable definition 
of a corporate acquisition, would not be troublesome. The problem of 
enforcement, however, is greatly complicated by the potential for blend-
ing the corporate and shareholder levels of taxation. Carryover basis 
treatment of intercorporate transactions is an entirely acceptable result 
because the liability for the corporate tax is merely deferred in the trans-
ferred basis. However, the sale of assets to an unincorporated purchaser 
cannot preserve the corporate tax. Even if the purchaser assumed a car-
ryover basis, a subsequent sale would only be subject to a single level of 
the individual income tax. 
It might therefore appear that sales to noncorporate purchasers could 
not be included within the scope of a carryover basis system for taxing 
acquisitions. If that is so, great difficulties would be created for imple-
menting a mandatory scheme. Because sales to different classes of pur-
chasers would have different income tax consequences, the complexity of 
the approach, both in principle and in practice, would be enormously 
increased. Moreover, since an unincorporated purchaser can incorpo-
rate, serious step transaction problems would hamper the enforcement of 
a mandatory system. At the worst, taxpayers would regain a transac-
tional election through the ability to use an unincorporated intermediary 
between the target and the acquiring corporation. Indeed, the entire sys-
tem for taxing acquisitions could be returned to its origins. The 1954 
codification of the General Utilities doctrine evolved from taxpayer at-
tempts to avoid the corporate level tax on intercorporate sales by wash-
ing the assets to be transferred through the shareholders of the target 
corporation. These difficulties for mandatory carryover basis, however, 
can be avoided. 
JOs Helvering v. Elkhorn Coal Co., 95 F.2d 732 (4th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 605 
(1938). Compare Rev. Rul. 70-434, 1970-2 C.B. 83. 
106 The Internal Revenue Service may have come to a similar conclusion. In Rev. Rul. 88-
48, 1988-1 C. B. 117, the Service ruled that the prior sale of 50% of the assets of the target did 
not bar a C reorganization if the acquiring corporation also obtained the proceeds of the sale. 
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From the perspective of the target corporation, the identity of the pur-
chaser of its assets is wholly immaterial. If it is improper to impose a 
corporate level tax upon the transfer of the ownership of a business, the 
impropriety is not relieved by a sale to a noncorporate purchaser. Under 
the historic General Utilities reconciliation, that proposition was fully im-
plemented: The identity of the purchaser was irrelevant to the forgiving 
of the corporate level tax. It has been argued here that the consequence 
of the General Utilities doctrine to target corporations in the context of 
acquisitive transactions was sound. That conclusion is not affected by the 
presence of a noncorporate purchaser. Both principle and the require-
ments for enforcing a mandatory system require that the carryover basis 
system of taxation include acquisitions by noncorporate, as well as cor-
porate, purchasers. 
A carryover basis system of taxing acquisitions by noncorporate pur-
chasers would not result in a greater reduction of the corporate income 
tax than would a carryover basis pattern of taxing acquisitions by corpo-
rate purchasers. As described above, in a corporate acquisition subject to 
a carryover basis system of taxation, the explicit corporate tax upon the 
target corporation is replaced by an implicit tax in the form of a purchase 
price reduction. Depending upon how the parties to the acquisition 
share the tax savings produced by the deferral of the income tax, the net 
proceeds received by the target shareholders in a carryover basis acquisi-
tion should approximate the proceeds they would receive in a fully taxa-
ble, cost basis acquisition. Under prior law, that result was not achieved 
because the cost basis obtained by the acquiring corporation eliminated 
the need for a purchase price adjustment, and thus, eliminated the im-
plicit tax on the target. In a carryover basis acquisition as proposed here, 
however, that implicit tax will be imposed. 
The amount of the implicit tax that must be imposed upon the target 
corporation in a carryover basis acquisition is a function of the rate of tax 
imposed upon the acquiring entity. That rate influences the level of the 
explicit tax imposed upon the acquiring entity and thus the size of the 
purchase price adjustment. If the rate of tax imposed upon an 
noncorporate purchaser is the same as the rate of tax imposed upon a 
corporate purchaser, the purchase price adjustment that each acquiring 
entity must make would be identical and thus the amount of the implicit 
tax would also be identical. Under these conditions, therefore, the target 
corporation would not avoid the consequential burden of the corporate 
tax through a sale to a noncorporate purchaser. 
Historically, the maximum rates of tax imposed upon unincorporated 
businesses have exceeded the rates of tax imposed upon corporations. 
Under those conditions, of course, the implicit tax that a noncorporate 
purchaser would be forced to impose upon the target would exceed the 
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implicit tax produced by a sale to a corporate purchaser. At present, the 
maximum marginal rate of tax imposed upon corporations slightly ex-
ceeds the maximum marginal rate imposed upon individuals107 and unin-
corporated businesses. Whether that minor rate inversion is retained or 
the historic rate relationship is reimposed, from the perspective of the 
target corporation, sales to noncorporate purchasers do not result in an 
avoidance of the corporate tax. 
When the acquiring entity is a corporation, a subsequent explicit tax 
will be imposed at the corporate level on the appreciation in the target 
assets that will not be imposed following a sale to an unincorporated 
purchaser. However, the absence of that corporate level tax is fully com-
pensated by the individual level tax108 that results from carryover basis 
treatment of the noncorporate purchaser. By contrast, were sales to 
noncorporate purchasers taxable, cost basis acquisitions, a corporate 
level tax would be imposed at the time of the sale and no tax liability 
would be assumed by the noncorporate purchaser. In the proposed car-
ryover basis treatment, no corporate level tax would be imposed on the 
target, but the deferred tax liability would be assumed by the 
noncorporate purchaser. In either case, the shareholders of the target 
will be fully subject to tax on the ultimate distribution of the proceeds of 
the sale, reduced by either the implicit or explicit tax imposed at the 
corporate level. 
Narrowly viewed, treating an acquisition by a noncorporate purchaser 
as a carryover basis transaction results in a reduction of corporate tax 
collections. However, as long as the rate of tax payable by noncorporate 
entities approximates or exceeds the rate of tax payable by corporations, 
that reduction in the corporate tax is fully compensated by an increase in 
the individual level tax, without any other revenue losses. Since carry-
over basis treatment of noncorporate purchasers is important to preserv-
ing the mandatory feature of the proposed system for taxing acquisitions 
and does not result in a revenue or equitable sacrifice, the definition of a 
corporate acquisition subject to carryover basis taxation should include 
acquisitions by noncorporate purchasers. 
That treatment of noncorporate purchasers would also control the tax-
ation of distributions in kind. A distribution in kind to shareholders is a 
107 Under § 1, the nominal maximum effective rate of tax is currently 28%. However, by 
virtue of a series of phased-out deductions and other allowances, most high income taxpayers 
will face marginal rates of tax that range from 33% to over 50%. See Coven, Congress as 
Indian-Giver: "Phasing-Out" Tax Allowances Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 6 
Va. Tax Rev. 505 (1987). 
ws If a noncorporate purchaser was subject to a low rate of tax, or was tax exempt, the tax 
on the purchaser would not compensate for the failure to impose the corporate level tax on the 
disposition. That imperfection, however, is no different from the tax leakage generally created 
by low rate acquiring entities. See note 53 and accompanying text. 
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transaction having an underlying dual character. Constructively, a cor-
poration is selling an asset to a purchaser that coincidentally happens to 
be its shareholder. At the same time, the corporation is making a distri-
bution to its shareholders of the proceeds of that constructive sale. 
Both aspects of the transactions are properly subject to tax in accord 
with their individual nature. Thus, under present law, the sale of the 
assets is a taxable transaction at the corporate level, while the receipt of 
the proceeds of the distribution is fully taxable at the shareholder level. 
If the proposal made here were adopted, the sale component of the distri-
bution in kind would be subject to tax in the same manner as if the sale 
were to an unrelated purchaser. Thus, if the assets distributed consisted 
of a business activity, the transfer would be subject to a carryover basis 
pattern of taxation; no tax would be imposed at the corporate level and 
the distributee shareholders would assume a carryover basis in the trans-
ferred assets. Upon the distribution of the proceeds of the constructive 
sale, however, the shareholders would be fully subject to tax as under 
present law. 109 
6. Politics and Simplification 
Any mandatory pattern for taxing corporate acquisitions would result 
in enormous simplification of the taxing system. Under present law, ac-
quisitions must be distinguished from nonacquisitive stock purchases on 
one side and from nonacquisitive asset transfers on the other. Moreover, 
reorganization-type carryover basis acquisitions must be distinguished 
from all other forms of acquisitions. Under any mandatory pattern, most 
of those arbitrary and scarcely enforceable lines would be abandoned. 
Firstly, the entire complicated set of rules defining and taxing reorga-
nizations would be entirely repealed. If a cost basis pattern were 
adopted, the reorganization provisions would be inconsistent with the 
pattern selected and would have to be eliminated. Conversely, if the car-
ryover basis pattern suggested here were selected, the reorganization 
109 While the taxation of distributions in kind does not present any additional conceptual 
hurdles, it does pose one practical problem. Because the sale of the corporate assets is con-
structive, the amount paid for the assets, and thus the amount of the taxable distribution, is not 
established by an actual transaction. It would not be appropriate to tax the shareholders on an 
amount equal to the market value of the distributed assets because those assets were construc-
tively purchased in a carryover basis transaction which would result in a discount in the 
purchase price and thus in the amount of the distribution to the shareholders. In principle, the 
sales price for the assets and thus the amount of the distribution should equal the value of the 
distributed assets less the present value of the deferred tax liability assumed by the sharehold-
ers in the carryover basis acquisition. However, while we expect the parties to an acquisition 
to negotiate a value of the deferred liability, only an imprecise and speculative value can be 
assigned to such a liability. 
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rules would be entirely subsumed with the scope of the new definition of 
an acquisition and would be unnecessary. 
That measure of simplification, however, would only be achieved if a 
mandatory pattern actually were adopted. While the practical possibility 
of enacting a rigorous carryover basis pattern of taxation is far from 
clear, the likelihood that a mandatory cost basis pattern of taxation 
would be adopted is virtually nonexistent. There are simply too many 
forms of corporate transactions, such as simple reincorporations, 110 that 
present a highly appealing case for nonrecognition carryover basis treat-
ment for the reorganization provisions to be wholly repealed. Absent 
that repeal, both cost and carryover basis acquisitions would continue to 
exist and there would not be a mandatory pattern of taxation. Rather, 
the existing line between cost and carryover basis acquisitions, at best, 
would merely have been somewhat rationalized. Accordingly, the only 
real possibility for substantially simplifying the taxation of corporate ac-
quisitions is the adoption of a mandatory carryover basis pattern of 
taxation. 
Secondly, under any mandatory system, at least for the purposes of the 
corporate level tax, only a single definitional line need be drawn. Under 
the proposal made here, there would be no occasion to define a corporate 
acquisition by reference to stock acquisitions for the purposes of univer-
sally applicable Code provisions, 111 for stock transfers, regardless of 
their nature, would not have corporate level consequences. Rather, the 
only definition needed would be of the transfer of a sufficient bundle of 
assets to constitute a separate trade or business. The drawing of such a 
single definitional line would greatly simplify the taxing system. Since 
stock transfers are inherently carryover basis transactions and assets 
transfers are inherently cost basis transactions, the task of drawing one 
or more lines across the continuum of transactions is unavoidable. How-
ever, the fewer the lines that are drawn, the less complex and less arbi-
trary will be the statutory pattern. Distinguishing between asset 
transfers involving an entire business activity and those that do not pro-
vides a single definitional line between cost and carryover basis acquisi-
tions and thus would contribute the maximum possible degree of 
simplification. Even were it assumed that the use of that definition to 
define an acquisition would increase the pressure on that definition, that 
cost would be more than offset by the simplification resulting from the 
use of a single definitional line. 
110 It would be unsound, for example, to impose a tax on the mere conversion of a New 
Jersey corporation into a Delaware corporation through the mechanism of a statutory merger 
with no material change in business or stockholders. 
Ill However, it might remain necessary to define acquisition-type transactions accomplished 
by stock transfers for other purposes of the Code. For example, the loss limiting rules of§ 382 
are triggered by a 50% change in the beneficial ownership of the loss corporation. 
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IV. RESTORING THE General Utilities COIIIPROl\liSE 
That a mandatory carryover basis pattern for taxing a corporate acqui-
sition is required by the only defensible definition of an acquisition does 
not, of course, alone demonstrate that such a pattern would be appropri-
ate in principle. However, carryover basis is in fact the pattern of taxa-
tion that is most consistent with the broad structure of the taxing system. 
Deferring the corporate level tax at the time the ownership of a business 
changes would restore the historic burden of taxation imposed upon cor-
porate acquisitions that was reflected in the General Utilities doctrine. 
A. Historic Reconciliation 
The fundamental logic of the separate entity concept is that changes in 
the ownership of incorporated business through sales of stock do not 
have income tax consequences at the corporate level. On the other hand, 
the demands of the corporate income tax require that sales of assets be 
subject to immediate tax at the corporate level. When all of the assets of 
a corporation are transferred, the demands of the corporate income tax 
conflict with the demands of the separate entity system of which the tax 
is a part. Since the choice of an asset, rather than a stock, transfer is 
almost entirely volitional and the distinction between these formats is 
largely formal, imposing differing burdens of taxation based upon that 
distinction is manifestly arbitrary and an undesirable elevation of form 
over substance in an area of the law having substantial importance. Ac-
cordingly, if the separate entity system bars a corporate level tax because 
of a change in the ownership of the business through a stock sale, a 
change in ownership occasioned by an asset sale ought not to be taxed 
differently. However, the demands of the corporate tax appear to require 
precisely that different treatment. 
Historically, that internal conflict in the taxing system has been recon-
ciled by excusing from the corporate level tax, in all forms of acquisi-
tions, the gain in assets that are being retained in the business which 
would not have been recognized in the absence of the transfer of the 
business. The demands of the corporate income tax unavoidably re-
quired that income that would be recognized in the ordinary course of 
business had the ownership of the business not changed be fully subject 
to tax. However, the logic of the tax did not require that the separate 
corporate entity be subject to tax on the appreciation in the assets that 
were retained in the business merely because the ownership of that busi-
ness changed. Since no such tax would have been imposed upon a 
change in ownership through a sale of stock, no such tax need be im-
posed upon a change in ownership accomplished by a sale of assets. As a 
result, the logic of the separate entity concept was given effect upon 
1989] TAXING CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 193 
changes of business ownership through asset transfers and was reconciled 
with the legitimate demands of the corporate tax. 
This judicially created and refined reconciliation of stock and asset ac-
quisitions, however, was overbroad in two critical respects. The doctrine 
did not distinguish between the severance of an asset from the business 
and the change in the ownership of the business. While the significant 
impact of the General Utilities doctrine was upon corporate acquisitions, 
the doctrine applied to a far greater range of transactions. Indeed, as 
originally developed, the doctrine excused from the corporate level tax 
the appreciation in any asset distributed to shareholders from either a 
liquidating or a continuing business. That aspect of the General Utilities 
doctrine opened massive opportunities for taxpayer abuse which were 
widely exploited. liz 
Secondly, the development of the doctrine, consistently with the gen-
eral development of the taxing system, was oriented towards taxpayers, 
not transactions. Thus, the exemption from the corporate level tax ex-
tended to sellers was not accompanied by a correlative adjustment to the 
purchaser. Rather, the purchaser of an asset was unaffected by the appli-
cation of the General Utilities doctrine to the seller and thus obtained a 
cost basis for the transferred asset, notwithstanding that the seller has 
been excused from tax. The result was a major erosion of the integrity of 
the corporate tax and an undesirable subsidy of acquisitive transactions. 
Because the acquiring corporation obtained a cost basis in the trans-
ferred assets, it was not required to assume the deferred tax liability of 
the target corporation. Accordingly, the purchase price for the target 
assets was not discounted by the present value of the tax liability, as 
would occur in a carryover basis acquisition. The absence of that dis-
count meant, of course, that the target corporation was not subjected to 
an implicit tax on the transfer. The failure of the General Utilities doc-
trine under prior law was not the failure to impose an explicit tax upon 
the target corporation. Rather, the inadequacy of prior law was the fail-
ure to impose an explicit tax upon the acquiring corporation which, in 
turn, permitted the target corporation to escape the imposition of an im-
plicit tax through an adjustment to the purchase price. 
These twin defects in the General Utilities doctrine led to its complete 
demise. Rather than distinguish among levels of asset transfers, all be-
came taxable. And, rather than impose a carryover basis upon the ac-
quiring corporation, a full corporate level tax was imposed upon the 
target. As a result, the historic compromise between the carryover basis 
demands of the separate entity approach and the cost basis demands of 
112 See, e.g., Bush Bros. & Co. v. Commissioner, 668 F.2d 252 (6th Cir. 1982). The General 
Utilities case itself involved a dividend distribution from a continuing corporation. 
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the corporate tax was eliminated from the taxing system. That was 
error. 
B. Propriety of the Single Tax Solution 
In evaluating the propriety of imposing a corporate level tax at the 
time of a change in ownership of a business, the ultimate issue, of course, 
is one of realization of income. In an ongoing business, a tax is not peri-
odically imposed on the appreciation in the value of the assets of the 
business; nor is the corporate taxpayer free to periodically purge the tax 
attributes of an ongoing business and obtain an increase in the basis for 
the business properties by volunteering a tax on their appreciation. The 
issue presented is whether those results should be different when there 
has been an antecedent change in the ownership of the incorporated busi-
ness. If the failure to impose a corporate level tax at the time of an acqui-
sitions would result in an undue under-taxation of any party to the 
transaction, the tax, of course, must be imposed. However, if explicit 
taxation is unnecessary to the integrity of the corporate or shareholder 
level tax, there would be no justification for altering the normal pattern 
of taxing incorporated business. 
Clearly enough, the imposition of that tax is not required to protect 
the integrity of the corporate income tax; that protection is fully pro-
vided by the carryover of tax attributes to the acquiring corporation. Ac-
cordingly, the justification for the imposition of the tax must be found in 
some requirement of the shareholder level tax. Thus, the issue of realiza-
tion at the corporate level must be resolved by determining whether the 
integrity of the shareholder level tax would be impaired by the absence of 
a corporate level levy. Significantly, therefore, regardless of whether the 
change in ownership of the business is accomplished by a stock or asset 
transfer, any justification for the imposition of a corporate level tax 
would necessarily be inconsistent with the separate entity concept. 
Whether the transfer of the ownership of a business is accomplished by 
an asset or a stock transfer, the purchase price will be determined by the 
asset value and earning potential of the business itself, taking into ac-
count the liabilities of the business assumed by the acquiring corporation. 
In a carryover basis acquisition, one of those liabilities is the deferred 
income tax liability of the target attributable to the appreciation in the 
value of its assets. As described above, given a perfectly functioning mar-
ketplace, in an asset acquisition, the target corporation and its sharehold-
ers will be forced to bear an implicit tax on the appreciation in the value 
of the target assets through a purchase price adjustment for the tax liabil-
ity assumed by the acquiring corporation. Since no greater price should 
be paid for the business in a stock acquisition, the shareholders would be 
required to bear a comparable burden regardless of the form of the trans-
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action. If that occurs, the integrity of the shareholder level tax, to the 
extent it is dependent upon taxation at the corporate level tax, will be 
preserved by a carryover basis pattern of taxation and the imposition of 
an explicit corporate level tax will be unnecessary. 
The commentators who have endorsed a cost basis approach to corpo-
ration acquisitions appear to have done so primarily in the belief that the 
marketplace for corporation acquisitions is far from perfect, and that in 
fact, the target corporation may not be required to bear an appropriately 
burdensome implicit tax. 113 While undoubtedly true, that perception 
merely discloses a private failure of negotiation that has no significance 
in the fashioning of tax rules. 
If the parties to an acquisition do not accurately value the tax liability 
assumed by the acquiring corporation, the purchase price for the target 
corporation will be erroneous. If the liability is largely ignored, as seems 
to be feared, the price will be unduly inflated. As a result, the target 
shareholders will derive a greater gain than would occur in a sale to a 
more careful buyer, but will be taxed on that greater amount. And, since 
the acquiring corporation will have paid for a value it did not receive, its 
shareholders will ultimately be entitled to an offsetting loss or reduction 
in gain. The net effect of the transaction will be a taxable shift of value 
from the buyer to the seller and an acceleration of the tax collection pro-
cess to the extent of the excessive price. Under these circumstances, 
there will not only be no revenue loss from ignoring the tax liabilities, 
there will be a revenue gain through acceleration. 114 In the interim, of 
course, the corporate level tax will be unaffected by the error for the 
amount of that tax will be perfectly preserved in the carryover basis. 
Many of the liabilities of the target corporation assumed in the acquisi-
tion will be difficult to value. If the parties so desire, they may ignore 
those liabilities altogether in establishing a purchase price for the busi-
ness. Should they proceed in such a marginally rational manner, the ac-
quiring corporation will overpay for the business and the target 
corporation will be overpaid for its assets. Such imperfections are more 
likely the rule than the exception in complex transactions, but have no 
implications for the taxing system. The improper valuation of an as-
sumed tax liability does not present any different issue. The economic 
benefit obtained by the target, and the economic detriment suffered by 
the acquiring corporation, attributable to a faulty valuation of the as-
sumed tax liability is of no different character than the consequences of 
any other misevaluation of the assets or liabilities of the target. 
113 See Lewis, A Proposal for a Corporate Level Tax on Major Stock Sales, 37 Tax Notes 
1041 (Dec. 7 1987). 
114 Conversely, if the parties overvalue the tax liability, the seller will not be adequately 
compensated for its properties and the tax imposed upon the target shareholders will be corre-
spondingly reduced. 
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The consequences of the erroneous valuation of a tax liability do not 
have any systematic effect upon the amount of tax imposed upon corpo-
rate acquisitions. While the error may result in a shift of value and tax 
liability between the parties to the transaction, the parties are in a posi-
tion to protect themselves from the consequences of their error through 
more careful negotiations. There is no occasion to alter the rules of taxa-
tion applicable to all acquisitions in order to protect the careless or ill 
advised. Accordingly, there is no principled need for the imposition of a 
corporate level tax on the value of a transferred business. 115 
Moreover, indisputably, the imposition of a corporate level tax upon a 
stock acquisition would be wholly inconsistent with the traditional un-
derstanding of the separate entity/double tax concept. Under that ap-
proach to corporate taxation, a corporate level tax is imposed as income 
is derived at the corporate level. Absent the immediate taxation of the 
shareholders on that income under some form of tax integration, that 
corporate tax is presumably necessary to prevent an undue deferral of 
any tax on the income so derived. A second tax, at the shareholder level, 
is imposed as the shareholder harvests the benefit from those corporate 
earnings, either through distributions or sales of stock. The gain derived 
by the shareholder on a sale of stock will, of course, reflect the value of 
unrealized appreciation in the assets of the corporation. Subjecting that 
gain to tax upon a sale of stock represents a voluntary acceleration of the 
shareholder's tax liability which, of course, is required by the shareholder 
level event. However, nothing in this double tax system suggests that 
this anticipation of gain by the shareholder should cause a similar accel-
eration of tax liability to the corporation. Rather, the corporate level tax 
continues to be imposed at the time that the corporation realizes its in-
come under the normal accounting rules of the Code. 
The enduring merit of the General Utilities doctrine lay in the recogni-
tion that, while imposing a corporate level tax following a stock acquisi-
tion was wholly inconsistent with the separate entity concept, excusing 
that tax following an asset acquisition was not wholly inconsistent with 
the integrity of the corporate income tax. Quite the contrary, continuing 
to defer the taxation of unrealized appreciation in the business assets 
seemed as appropriate following an asset transfer as it was following a 
stock transfer. Since the overall rationality of the system would be pro-
115 When the target corporation is closely held, there is a further reason for not imposing a 
corporate level tax at the time of an acquisition. Most closely held corporations do not pay a 
significant entity level tax, often because corporate profits are remitted to the owners of the 
business through techniques that permit income tax deductions for the amount distributed. 
See Lee, Entity Classification and Integration: Publicly Traded Partnerships, Personal Service 
Corporations and the Tax Legislative Process, 8 Va. Tax Rev. 57 (1988). It would be perverse 
and unwarranted for the only occasion upon which a significant corporate level tax was im-
posed to be at the time of the disposition of the business. 
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mated by imposing comparable burdens of taxation on stock and asset 
acquisitions, logic demanded that the corporate level tax on asset acquisi-
tions be excused, notwithstanding the insubstantial tension with the cor-
porate income tax so created. 
The broadest features of the taxing system are most compatible with 
the notion that a mere change in the ownership of a business, regardless 
of how accomplished, does not result in a corporate level tax upon the 
appreciation in the value of the assets that are retained in that business. 
That result should be secured by returning to the General Utilities com-
promise that has prevailed since the inception of the income tax by 
adopting a mandatory carryover basis approach to taxing acquisitions. 
V. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CoRPORATE AND SHAREHOLDER LEVEL 
TAX 
To this point the analysis has been limited to the proper taxation of a 
corporate acquisition at the corporate level; no consideration has been 
given to the implications of a mandatory carryover basis pattern of taxa-
tion at the shareholder level. Under a rigorous approach to the separate 
entity concept, that treatment of acquisitions would be sufficient; there 
would be no shareholder level implications of the configuration of the 
corporate tax. If, in connection with a change in ownership of an incor-
porated business, a shareholder disposed of his or her stock, the transac-
tion would be taxable in accordance with the rules of the individual 
income tax. Historically, however, the taxation of corporate acquisitions 
has involved interrelated consequences at both the corporate and share-
holder levels. 
Without doubt, shareholders who actually receive cash or property, 
other than a security in a corporate party to the acquisition, must be 
subject to immediate income taxation. The open issues are the extent to 
which a shareholder not receiving cash or property can ever be entitled 
to nonrecognition, on the one hand, and the extent to which such a 
shareholder must be subject to tax, on the other. Neither issue has any 
implications for the integrity of the corporate level tax. Carryover basis 
preserves that tax and further requires that the burden of that tax be 
borne by the target corporation and its shareholders through the implicit 
tax caused by the purchase price for the business. Rather, these issues 
relate to the integrity of the shareholder level tax. 
A. Nonrecognition 
In its elementary form, under current law, the target shareholders will 
be taxed upon a transfer of their stock to the acquiring corporation or 
upon redemption by the target corporation unless the transaction consti-
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tutes a reorganization. In that event, which implies that a substantial 
fraction of the target shareholders obtain an equity interest in the acquir-
ing corporation, target shareholders receiving such an interest are not 
subject to a current tax. Rather, like the target corporation itself, their 
gain is deferred in the basis of the replacement stock. Thus, nonrecogni-
tion at the shareholder level requires the presence of an acquisition and 
that all or a substantial portion of the target shareholders obtain stock in 
the acquiring corporation. 
The circumstances, if any, under which shareholders of the target 
should be entitled to nonrecognition treatment on the receipt of stock in 
the acquiring corporation is an issue of policy that has no technical sig-
nificance to the basic proposal made here. The desirability of a 
mandatory carryover basis pattern of taxation would not be affected by 
whether nonrecognition at the shareholder level is always prohibited, 
granted only if a specified fraction of the target shareholders received 
stock in the acquiring corporation, or granted on a shareholder-by-share-
holder basis. However, it is likely that any system for taxing corporate 
acquisitions that would be adopted would include some potential for 
nonrecognition at the shareholder level. Just as appealing cases for non-
recognition at the corporate level would likely bar the adoption of a 
mandatory cost basis pattern of taxation, similar cases involving little 
substantive change in the business would undoubtedly result in the adop-
tion of a mechanism for extending nonrecognition at the shareholder 
level. 
Providing for nonrecognition at the shareholder level, however, would 
unavoidably reintroduce a measure of the complexity that the proposal 
here would otherwise eliminate from the taxation of acquisitions. 
Plainly, not every occasional exchange of stock in one corporation for 
stock in another can be entitled to nonrecognition; only exchanges in 
connection with a change in the ownership of a business could be eligible. 
That precondition poses no obstacle to defining the scope of shareholder 
nonrecognition following an asset acquisition. Under the proposal made 
here, acquisitive and nonacquisitive asset transfers would be distin-
guished. Shareholder level nonrecognition, if it is to be granted, would 
be available only upon the distribution of securities of an acquiring cor-
poration following a carryover basis acquisition. 
If nonrecognition is to be permitted following as asset acquisition, con-
siderations of neutrality would seem to require comparable treatment fol-
lowing a stock acquisition. However, for the purposes of the corporate 
level consequences of an acquisition, the proposal would eliminate a 
stock transfer based definition of an acquisition. Thus, extending nonrec-
ognition at the shareholder level following a stock acquisition would re-
quire reintroducing a definition of a stock acquisition for the purpose of 
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establishing the precondition for nonrecognition treatment at the share-
holder level. 
The reintroduction of such a definition would not be incompatible with 
the substantive proposals made here for imposing carryover basis treat-
ment at the corporate level. For that purpose, a stock transfer based 
definition of an acquisition was abandoned because it was not consistent 
with the implementation of a mandatory carryover basis system. A defi-
nition of a stock acquisition that would only be relevant to a determina-
tion of the shareholder level consequences of the transaction and not to 
the corporate level consequences would be essentially unrelated to the 
carryover basis system. 
Similarly, the introduction of a stock based definition of an acquisition 
for this purpose would not unduly detract from the simplification sought 
by this proposal. Under present law, nonrecognition at the shareholder 
level is, in effect, a part of the definition of a reorganization and thus 
directly affects the corporate level consequences of a transaction. As a 
result, defining the scope of shareholder nonrecognition is of considerable 
importance, and little flexibility exists in the range of acceptable defini-
tions. Under the proposal here, however, shareholder level tax conse-
quences would have no impact on the treatment of the transaction at the 
corporate level. The scope of shareholder nonrecognition, therefore, 
would be fashioned without reference to a corporate level effect, but, far 
more rationally, solely by reference to whatever policy justification for 
shareholder nonrecognition is found to exist. For example, shareholder 
nonrecognition might be available to any shareholder who exchanged 
target stock for stock of a second corporation which owned or was ac-
quiring over 50% of the stock of the target, wholly without regard to the 
nature of the consideration received by the other target shareholders. 
Further, nonrecognition might be barred for exchanges of publicly 
traded securities or where publicly traded securities were received in ex-
change for nonpublicly traded target securities. 
B. Mandatory Shareholder Level Taxation 
The question of whether, under certain circumstances, the price for a 
carryover basis at the corporate level should include a shareholder level 
tax is of greater importance. Historically, an immediate shareholder 
level tax has not been required for carryover basis treatment when the 
consideration for the acquisition was stock of the acquiring corporation. 
In such a reorganization, the shareholder level tax, like the corporate 
level tax, was deferred in the basis of the stock received. Absent reorgan-
ization characterization, however, the pattern was less clear. In a stock 
purchase, the shareholders were by definition subject to tax notwith-
standing the carryover basis at the corporate level-a somewhat inconsis-
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tent result. In an asset purchase, the same immediate shareholder level 
tax was required by the statutory extension of the General Utilities doc~ 
trine in old§ 337. However,§ 337 extended a complete exemption from 
the corporate level tax, rather than a deferral, and the insistence upon a 
liquidation producing a shareholder level tax merely required that one 
level of explicit tax be imposed upon the asset transfer. Had prior law 
more correctly provided for a deferral of the corporate tax on an asset 
acquisition, it is unclear whether the shareholder level tax would have 
been regarded as essential. 
In principle, there is no reason to require an immediate shareholder 
level tax following a carryover basis asset acquisition even when the con~ 
sideration is entirely in cash. The target corporation will have been re-
quired to bear an implicit tax in the transaction through an adjustment to 
the purchase price. As a result, the net proceeds of the sale held at the 
corporate level should correspond to the after-tax proceeds of a taxable 
sale, increased by the share of the benefit from the deferral of the corpo-
rate tax that is obtained by the target. Since a shareholder level tax has 
never been thought necessary following a taxable sale of assets, there 
seems to be no reason for such a requirement following a carryover basis 
acquisitiop.. 116 Thus, in principle, a carryover basis asset acquisition 
should not require the liquidation of the target or other mandatory impo-
sition of tax at the shareholder level. 
If the target corporation in an asset acquisition is not required to dis-
tribute the proceeds of the sale, the taxation of acquisitions at the share-
holder level may differ, depending upon whether an asset or stock 
acquisition is used. To the extent that the consideration for the acquisi-
tion consists of cash, the shareholders of the target would be able to elect 
between a taxable stock sale or a nonrecognition asset sale. However, if 
116 There is one difference between cost and carryover basis acquisitions that might be 
thought to require the distribution of the proceeds of a carryover basis acquisition if a preferen-
tial rate of tax on capital gains were reintroduced. In a carryover basis acquisition, the earn-
ings and profits account of the transferred business would pass to the acquiring corporation. 
Following the transfer of all of the assets of a nonsubsidiary corporation, the target corpora-
tion would hold substantial liquid assets but would not have any earnings and profits. The 
resulting ability of the target to make periodic distributions to its shareholders that are not 
taxable as dividends could be viewed as excessively favorable. However, such a target corpora-
tion would be subject to a corporate level tax, and would generate earnings and profits, to the 
extent of the return on its investment of the proceeds of the acquisition. Subjecting that return 
to double taxation at ordinary income rates would in fact constitute a sufficient income tax 
burden. 
Indeed, if capital gains were preferentially taxed, a substantial incentive would exist for the 
target shareholders following any form of asset acquisition to voluntarily accept a taxable dis-
tribution from the target corporation. The immediate distribution of the proceeds of a carry-
over basis transfer would be favorably taxed, while deferred periodic distributions would 
attract double taxation and ordinary income treatment. That incentive, at least in smaller 
corporations, may accomplish nearly the same result as a compulsory distribution 
requirement. 
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in a stock acquisition the target shareholders are permitted to receive 
stock of the acquiring corporation without an immediate tax, either as 
under current law or as suggested above, that election at the shareholder 
level will exist in all events. No greater deferral of tax would be created 
by not taxing shareholders who simply retained their target stock. Ac-
cordingly, the requirements of the shareholder level tax do not compel 
the taxation of the target shareholders who retain stock in the target cor-
poration. And, since the corporate level tax fs preserved in the carried 
over basis, there is no technical necessity for insisting upon a distribution 
by the target corporation. 
The consequence of not requiring an actual or constructive distribu-
tion to shareholders following either a cost or a carryover basis asset 
acquisition is to permit the shareholders of the target corporation to de-
fer taxation on the appreciation in the value of the target corporation, 
notwithstanding that the corporation has entirely disposed of the appre-
ciated business. Certainly it would not be unreasonable to view such a 
transaction as a disposition by the shareholders of the target that ought 
to be taxed to them. Such a rule, however, would be tantamount to re-
quiring a contraction of target corporations in the wake of any disposi-
tion of a business activity. Whether, and to what extent, such a 
requirement would be wise raises an issue of policy that goes beyond the 
technical requirements of the income tax and the scope of this article. 
Either resolution of that issue is entirely consistent with the proposal 
made here. Since there is no greater technical necessity for a distribution 
requirement following a carryover basis acquisition than following a cost 
basis acquisition, the question of mandatory distributions to shareholders 
can be resolved independently. 117 
C. Corporate Shareholders 
Some of the greatest conceptual difficulties in the design of a pattern 
for taxing all corporate transactions, including acquisitions, stem from 
the relationship between parent and subsidiary corporations. The taxing 
system has never consistently treated either the parent corporation as a 
mere investor in the subsidiary or the corporate group as a single entity. 
117 Other issues of tax policy, however, might well affect the ultimate decision to impose a 
distribution requirement following at least some carryover basis acquisitions. In light of the 
basis adjustment without tax extended at death, IRC § 1014, for example, Congress might well 
conclude that the carryover basis acquisition of at least a closely held, nonsubsidiary corpora-
tion should be accompanied by a shareholder level tax. 
Also, it was observed above that the greatest pressure on the proposed definition of an acqui-
sition would come from efforts to convert ordinary sales into carryover basis acquisitions. 
Some form of distribution requirement would impose a cost on acquisition treatment that 
would deter these attempts. A distribution requirement tailored to potentially abusive situa-
tions, perhaps waivable in the discretion of the Commissioner, might thus be found desirable. 
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Thus, on the sale of stock in the subsidiary, it is not clear whether the 
transaction should be taxed in the same manner as the sale of a nonsub-
sidiary corporation or should be viewed as the sale of business assets by 
the parent corporation.118 
Notwithstanding the historical ambiguity, however, if a subsidiary cor-
poration is subject to the same rules that govern nonsubsidiary corpora-
tions, multiple tiers of taxation will be imposed. If a sale of the stock of 
the subsidiary is fully subject to tax but the basis of the assets of the 
subsidiary are not affected by the transaction-as would occur upon the 
sale of nonsubsidiary stock-a third level of tax will be imposed upon 
that incorporated business upon a later sale of the acquired assets. The 
potential for multiple tiers of taxation is a byproduct of the repeal of the 
General Utilities doctrine. Prior to repeal, while the sale of the subsidiary 
stock might be taxable, the assets of the subsidiary could obtain a step up 
in tax basis without further tax. 
While the two levels of tax that resulted from the repeal of General 
Utilities have been embraced by many advocates of that change in the 
law, multiple tiers of taxation have not. Rather, a consensus seems to 
have emerged that such a third or greater tier tax is neither necessary nor 
appropriate to the integrity of the corporate income tax. Accordingly, a 
series of recent amendments to current law permits the parties to the sale 
of stock in a subsidiary to treat the transaction as a sale of the assets of 
the subsidiary. 119 At present, the effect of that election is to forgive the 
third tier tax on the stock sale provided that the constructive asset sale is 
treated as a fully taxable, cost basis acquisition. 120 Under the mandatory 
carryover basis proposal made here, the corporate tax on an asset sale 
would be deferred, rather than immediately imposed. However, that 
deferral of the corporate level tax on the appreciation in the assets of the 
subsidiary does not alter the propriety of forgiving the third tier tax on 
the transfer of the stock of the subsidiary. Presumably, therefore, under 
the proposal made here, the sale of stock in a subsidiary should continue 
to have the same consequences to both the seller and purchaser as would 
the sale of the assets of the subsidiary. 
The result should not be different if the selling corporate shareholder 
disposes of less than all of the stock of the target subsidiary, either be-
cause it owned less than all of the stock or because it retained some por-
tion of the stock. The mandatory feature of the proposal here would be 
wholly undermined if these "creeping dispositions" could avoid the car-
11s The Reporter's proposals on intercorporate dividends which accompany the American 
Law Institute study seek avenues for rationalizing this area. See Subchapter C Project, note 9, 
at 490-513. 
119 IRC §§ 338(h)(l0), 336(e). 
12o H.R. Rep. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. II-203-04 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 
1986-3 C.B. (vol. 4) 173. 
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ryover basis system. The sale of a fraction of the stock of a subsidiary is 
the functional equivalent of a sale of an undivided interest in the underly-
ing assets of the target. If the assets in question consist of a business and 
thus would produce a carryover basis acquisition if entirely sold, the sale 
of a fraction of the business should not produce a different result. A 
fractional sale of assets thus should be a carryover basis transaction. The 
same consequence should attach to a sale of stock. Therefore, the sale of 
less than all of the stock of a target subsidiary must also be a carryover 
basis transaction to the selling and purchasing corporate shareholders. 
On the other hand, the sale of stock that represents a mere portfolio 
investment of working capital plainly is not entitled to the consequences 
of a corporation acquisition. Rather, such ordinary business transactions 
should be fully taxed. The line between the sale of a portfolio investment 
and a disposition of a portion of a subsidiary obviously lacks economic 
definition and must be arbitrary. Existing law, however, provides such a 
definition for other purposes of the tax law. Under§ 243, 121 for example, 
the amount of the intercorporate dividends received exclusion is reduced 
for stock held as a mere portfolio investment. Presumably, a consistent 
line should be drawn for the purposes of defining an acquisition. 
CoNCLUSION 
The question of how a corporate acquisition ought to be subject to tax 
does not have a technically perfect answer. The fundamental structure of 
the taxing system contains inherent contradictions which preclude deriv-
ing an answer that can be defended through the elaboration of principles 
upon which all students of taxation would agree. As a result, rational-
izing this area of the taxing system requires identifying the pattern of 
taxation that will result in the least economic distortion and will be most 
compatible with the other broad feature of the legal system. The sugges-
tion here is that those requirements are best achieved through a 
mandatory carryover basis system. 
Regardless of the merits of this proposal, however, the need to quite 
generally overhaul the taxation of corporate acquisitions is entirely evi-
dent. Moreover, any such revision must be comprehensive, including 
both taxable and reorganization acquisitions within a single scheme. 
Seventy years of ad hoc statutory and judicial development have resulted 
in a framework that is needlessly complex, internally inconsistent, and 
noted for its irrationality. The issue is no longer whether this area of the 
law should be revised; rather, it is the way in which that revision should 
be directed. 
121 IRC § 243(c). 
